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HEADS I WIN, TAILS YOU LOSE:  
RECONCILING BROWN V. GARDNER’S 
PRESUMPTION THAT INTERPRETIVE DOUBT 
BE RESOLVED IN VETERANS’ FAVOR WITH 
CHEVRON 
LINDA D. JELLUM*  
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the United 
States Supreme Court held that agencies should determine the meaning of 
ambiguous statutes.  But in the veterans law case Brown v. Gardner, the Supreme 
Court directed lower courts to resolve interpretive doubt in ambiguous statutes in 
favor of veterans.  Which interpretation controls when a statute is ambiguous—the 
agency’s reasonable interpretation or the veteran’s interpretation?  To date, none 
of the courts faced with this conflict have resolved this question clearly or 
definitively; indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 
recently asked the Supreme Court for guidance. To date, none has been 
forthcoming.   
In this article, I solve the conflict between Chevron’s deference and Gardner’s 
veteran-friendly presumption.  First, Gardner’s Presumption should revert to a 
liberal construction canon that requires courts to construe veterans’ statutes 
liberally to further their remedial purposes, rather than in the veteran-litigant’s 
                                                          
 *  Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law; 
Associate Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law; J.D., Cornell Law School; 
B.A., Cornell University.  The article is the third in a series of articles that resulted from my 
participation in the Twelfth Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for 
Veterans Claims held in March 2010 in Washington, D.C.  I would like to thank the 
organizers of the conference, Judge Davis and Judge Hagel, and especially Professor 
Michael Allen, for inviting me to speak and for reviewing drafts of this paper.  I also 
appreciate the comments and suggestions of Professors Jack Beerman, William Funk, 
Richard Murphy, and the faculty of Florida State University College of Law who attended 
my development workshop on September 27, 2011.  Thanks to Mercer University School of 
Law for research and technological assistance.  Finally, I would like to thank my research 
assistants, Troy Clark (J.D., 2010) and Nick Phillips (J.D. Candidate, 2012) for their 
outstanding and tireless help with the research for and editing of this paper.  Any remaining 
errors are mine alone.   
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favor.  The Presumption was originally a liberal construction canon before 
morphing into its present super-strong formulation.  Second, courts should apply 
Gardner’s Presumption in limited situations.  Specifically, courts should apply 
Gardner’s Presumption only when the statute at issue addresses veterans’ benefits 
and only when the VA has not already interpreted the statute in a way that entitles 
it to Chevron deference.  Third, alternatively and most promisingly, Gardner’s 
Presumption could be viewed as a duty belonging to the VA rather than as an 
interpretive canon that courts apply.  Regardless of which solution prevails, it is 
time to settle this conflict. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In its landmark decision, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.,1 the United States Supreme Court altered the 
balance of interpretive power.  Prior to Chevron, courts determined the 
meaning of ambiguous regulatory statutes; after Chevron, agencies 
determined the meaning of ambiguous regulatory statutes.  While the effect 
of Chevron is much more nuanced than this simple truism, for the purposes 
of this Article, the statement is sufficient. 
Yet, this truism does not hold true within veterans law.  Within veterans 
law, there is a third player who has an interpretive role:  the veteran.  The 
veteran plays an interpretive role because of an unusual presumption 
identified by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Gardner.2  Stated simply, 
Gardner’s Presumption3 directs courts to resolve interpretive doubt in favor 
of the veteran.4  Gardner’s Presumption has become a legend in veterans’ 
jurisprudence, as veteran-litigants5 and their counsel raise it often.6  
Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 
(“Veterans Court”) and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit cite the Presumption frequently.7  Even the Supreme Court 
occasionally refers to it.8  Yet, Gardner’s Presumption conflicts directly 
with Chevron.9  
In Chevron, the Supreme Court directed courts to defer to reasonable 
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes pursuant to a two-step 
                                                          
 1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Although many commentators insert commas in the official 
cite, there are no commas in the petitioner’s name in the official U.S. Reports.  Thomas W. 
Merrill, The Story of Chevron:  The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in STRAUSS’ 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 399 n.1 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006). 
 2. 513 U.S. 115 (1994). 
 3. This is my term, not the courts’ term. 
 4. Gardner, 513 U.S. at 118. 
 5. While I use the terms “veteran” and “veteran-litigant” when speaking of someone 
seeking benefits from the Veterans Administration, the terms are meant to include veterans 
and their beneficiaries, who are also entitled to some benefits. 
 6. See Haas v. Peake, 544 F.3d 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (raising 
Gardner’s Presumption for the first time in a petition for rehearing); Sursely v. Peake, 22 
Vet. App. 21, 23 (2007), rev’d, 551 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Smith v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. 
App. 63, 69 (2005), rev’d, 451 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Debeaord v. Principi, 18 Vet. 
App. 357, 362 (2004); Theiss v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 204, 206 (2004); Jones v. Principi, 
16 Vet. App. 219, 222–23 (2002) (noting for the first time that the issue was raised in a 
veteran’s brief); cf. Osman v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 252, 254 (2008) (raising the precursor to 
Gardner’s Presumption in an amicus brief). 
 7.  See, e.g., Nielson v. Shinseki, 607 F.3d 802, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Carpenter v. 
Principi, 15 Vet. App. 64, 76 (2001). 
 8. See, e.g., Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1206 (2011) (recognizing that the 
Court has “long applied [the canon]”). 
 9. Compare Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 117–18 (1994) (stating that “interpretive 
doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor”) with Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (stating that a court cannot substitute its 
reading of a statute when an agency has reasonably interpreted the statute). 
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analysis.10  Under Chevron’s first step, a court should determine “whether 
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”11  If 
Congress has not so spoken, then, pursuant to Chevron’s second step, a 
court must accept any “permissible” or “reasonable” agency 
interpretation.12  In contrast, Gardner’s Presumption directs that any 
statutory interpretive doubt—which the Veterans Court has equated with 
ambiguity—be resolved in a veteran’s favor.13  Therein lies the conflict:  
which interpretation controls when a statute is ambiguous, the agency’s 
reasonable interpretation or the veteran’s interpretation?  To date, none of 
the courts faced with this conflict have resolved this question even though 
the Veterans Court recently called for the Supreme Court’s guidance.14 
In this Article, I answer that plea by exploring and resolving the conflict 
between Chevron and Gardner’s Presumption.  In Part I of this Article, I 
briefly describe the history of the Veterans Court, the nonadversarial nature 
of the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (“VA”) administrative process, and 
the unique features of veterans law that explain why this Presumption 
developed and then morphed.15  In Part II, I identify how Gardner’s 
Presumption started as a liberal construction canon and transformed into 
the veterans’ trump card that it is today.16  In Part III, I examine the role 
that Gardner’s Presumption has played in the Veterans Court, the Federal 
Circuit, and the Supreme Court.17  Next, in Part IV, I explain the conflict 
between Gardner’s Presumption and Chevron and trace how the Veterans 
Court and the Federal Circuit have unsuccessfully attempted to resolve that 
conflict.18  Finally, in Part V, I offer a number of ways to resolve the 
conflict.19 
While this discussion is critically relevant to those involved in veterans 
law, it is also relevant to anyone applying Chevron and remedial-based 
statutory interpretation canons, such as the rule of lenity or the derogation 
canon.  While Chevron directs that deference is owed to any reasonable 
                                                          
 10. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44. 
 11. Id. at 843.    
 12. Id. at 843–44.    
 13. Gardner, 513 U.S. at 117–18.  There was a similar presumption in tax jurisprudence 
that holds tax laws “are to be interpreted liberally in favor of the taxpayers.”  Bowers v. 
New York & Albany Lighterage Co., 273 U.S. 346, 350 (1927).  The presumption has 
morphed with time.  See Steve R. Johnson, Should Ambiguous Revenue Laws Be Interpreted 
in Favor of Taxpayers?,  NEVADA LAWYER, April 2002, at 15 (exploring how the taxpayer 
presumption has changed due to broad social change).  
 14. Debeaord v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 357, 368 (2004). 
 15. See infra Part I. 
 16. See infra Part II. 
 17. See infra Part III.  To do so, I have read and evaluated every case from the Veterans 
Court, Federal Circuit, and Supreme Court through April 2011 in which Gardner’s 
Presumption was mentioned.  
 18. See infra Part IV. 
 19. See infra Part V. 
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agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute, remedial canons direct that 
broad interpretations should control when statutes are ambiguous.  How 
should that conflict be resolved?  This article answers that question in the 
context of veterans law. 
I. VETERANS LAW:  A NONADVERSARIAL SYSTEM 
Understanding why Gardner’s Presumption developed and became so 
legendary within veterans law requires an understanding of the 
development of the Veterans Court.20  Judicial review of VA decisions is 
relatively recent.  Prior to 1988, VA benefit decisions were non-
reviewable.21  The VA acted in “splendid isolation.”22  Congress precluded 
review of such decisions, in part, due to the financial pressures of the Great 
Depression; essentially, Congress opted to save the government money and 
resources by denying review.23  Not surprisingly, veterans disliked this 
system and fought for change.24  In 1988, Congress created the Veterans 
Court, an Article I court, to provide judicial oversight of VA benefit 
decisions and to guarantee that those who risked their lives to defend 
America would have their day in court.25  For the first time in history, 
veterans could seek review of adverse VA decisions. 
The Veterans Court is unique.  It has nine judges, whom the President 
appoints with the advice and consent of the Senate.26  It is an appellate 
                                                          
 20. See generally, James D. Ridgway, The Veterans’ Judicial Review Act Twenty Years 
Later:  Confronting the New Complexities of the Veterans Benefits System, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 251 (2010) (explaining how the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act moved the VA 
system from a charitable model to one of entitlement). 
 21. Act of March 20, 1933, ch. 3, § 5, 48 Stat. 9 (1933) (“All decisions rendered by the 
Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs . . . shall be final and conclusive on all questions of law 
and fact, and no other official or court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to review . 
. . .”).  
 22. Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 122 (1994) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 100-963, pt. 1, 
at 10 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  For detail regarding the development of 
the VA system and judicial review, see James D. Ridgway, The Splendid Isolation 
Revisited:  Lessons from the History of Veterans’ Benefits Before Judicial Review, 3 VET. L. 
REV. 135 (2011); see also Ihor Gawdiak et al., Fed. Research Div., Library of Cong., 
VETERANS BENEFITS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW:  HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM (Mar. 1992). 
 23. See Scott H. Reisch, 211 In Progress:  Must the Veterans’ Administration Comply 
with Federal Law?, 40 STAN. L. REV. 323, 323 & n.4 (1987).  While most VA benefit 
decisions were non-reviewable, there were some exceptions.  See Johnson v. Robison, 415 
U.S. 361, 367 (1974) (holding appellees could challenge the constitutionality of VA 
decisions); Barton F. Stichman, The Impact of the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act on the 
Federal Circuit, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 855, 856–57 (1992) (noting that courts could hear 
challenges that VA regulations were arbitrary and capricious or violated statutory authority). 
 24. See Laurence R. Helfer, The Politics of Judicial Structure:  Creating the United 
States Court of Veterans Appeals, 25 CONN. L. REV. 155, 162–65 (1992) (discussing 
veterans’ dissatisfaction with the VA adjudication process prior to 1988). 
 25. Id.    
 26. Originally, only seven judges were to be appointed for fifteen-year terms.  38 
U.S.C. § 7253(a), (c).  Congress later added two positions on a temporary basis.  38 U.S.C. 
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court and, thus, it lacks authority to make factual determinations, except as 
to jurisdiction and prejudicial error.27  Interestingly, the court can act either 
by three-judge panels or by a single judge.28  The single-judge decision-
making authority is unique to the Veterans Court and, while somewhat 
controversial, it may be a necessity.29  The court has a crushing caseload:  
for example, in 2009, veterans filed 4,725 new cases with the court, which 
rendered 4,379 decisions.30 
The veterans law system is distinctive in two important ways.  First, “the 
VA [administrative] process is a nonadversarial one.”31  Congress 
specifically included a number of statutory advantages to veterans to ensure 
the nonadversarial and pro-claimant character of the administrative 
process.32  For example, the VA must notify claimants of what they must 
do to establish an entitlement to benefits.33  This notice must include “any 
information, and any medical or lay evidence, not previously provided to 
the Secretary that is necessary to substantiate the claim.”34  Additionally, 
                                                          
§ 7251(h). 
 27. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(c).  
 28. 38 U.S.C. § 7254(b). 
 29. See, e.g., Sarah M. Haley, Note, Single-Judge Adjudication in the Court of Appeals 
for Veterans Claims and the Devaluation of Stare Decisis, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 535 (2004) 
(discussing critics’ simultaneous praise and condemnation of the court); Ronald L. Smith, 
The Administration of Single Judge Decisional Authority by the United States Court of 
Appeals for Veterans Claims, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 279 (2004) (noting the 
overwhelming number of appeals heard by the court). 
 30. Michael P. Allen, Due Process and the American Veteran:  What the Constitution 
Can Tell Us About the Veterans’ Benefits System, 80 U. Cinn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011) 
(citing Annual Reports, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, available at 
http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/Annual_Report_FY_2009_October_1 
_2008_to_September_30_2009.pdf [hereinafter VETERANS COURT ANNUAL REPORTS]).  
 31. Robinette v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 69, 75 (1995); see Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. 
Ct. 1197, 1200 (2011) (recognizing that the VA’s process for adjudicating a claim is non 
adversarial); accord Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 323, 333–
34 (1985) (stating that the system is designed to be “as informal and nonadversarial as 
possible”); Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (concluding that because 
the system is “so uniquely pro-claimant,” fairness is of great importance); Collaro v. West, 
136 F.3d 1304, 1309–10 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (recognizing that the system is “nonadversarial, ex 
parte, [and] paternalistic”). 
 32. See Allen, Due Process and the American Veteran, supra note 30 (noting that when 
a veteran receives a satisfactory decision from the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, the process 
ends, but that a veteran who remains unsatisfied has an opportunity to appeal); Michael P. 
Allen, The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims at Twenty:  A Proposal for a 
Legislative Commission to Consider its Future, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 365–72 (2009) 
(same); Michael P. Allen, Significant Developments in Veterans Law (2004–2006) and 
What They Reveal About the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 483, 488 (2007) (explaining 
that Congress, in instituting the Veterans Court, provided for the first time “a meaningful 
and predictably available independent review of VA benefits decisions”). 
 33. 38 U.S.C. § 5102(a). 
 34. Id. § 5103(a); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1) (adopting regulations implementing 
the statutory duty to assist).  Note the unusual nature of this obligation was recognized by 
one member of the Supreme Court.  Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696, 1709 (2009) 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (“The VA differs from virtually every other agency in being itself 
JELLUM.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/2/2011  5:18 PM 
2011] RECONCILING BROWN V. GARDNER’S PRESUMPTION 65 
the VA Secretary cannot appeal a decision from the VA that favors the 
veteran.35  However, once a veteran files a notice of appeal with the 
Veterans Court, the nonadversarial nature of the proceedings disappears.36  
Second, the veterans law system is distinctive in that the proportion of 
litigants filing a notice of appeal pro se is the highest of any federal 
appellate court in the country, averaging roughly seventy to eighty 
percent.37  This high pro se rate developed, in part, because of the 
disincentives for lawyers to participate.  For example, until 1988, lawyers 
could earn no more than ten dollars for assisting veterans with their 
claims.38  Given that the veterans’ system is nonadversarial, pro-claimant, 
and pro se, it might be expected that a presumption favoring veteran-
friendly interpretations of ambiguous statutes would arise. 
II. THE CREATION OF GARDNER’S PRESUMPTION 
In a system that respects and values veterans to such a high degree, it 
should come as no surprise that Gardner’s Presumption, which directs 
courts to interpret ambiguous statutes in favor of veterans, would develop.  
However, Gardner’s Presumption began life in a less veteran-friendly 
form.  This next section explores the development of Gardner’s 
Presumption from its humble beginnings as a liberal construction canon to 
its current formulation as a tie-breaking trump card. 
                                                          
obligated to help the claimant develop his claim . . . .”); see also Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of 
Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 323, 333–34 (1985) (indicating that veterans are given 
safeguards including adequate representation, a duty on the part of the adjudicator to help 
the veteran, and “significant concessions with respect to the claimant’s burden of proof”). 
 35. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a).  However, any aggrieved party may appeal a Veterans Court 
decision to the Federal Circuit.  38 U.S.C. § 7292.  The Federal Circuit has the power to 
review legal questions only; it cannot rule on factual determination or on the application of 
law to the facts in a particular case.  38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). 
 36. The Veterans Court advises litigants that “[t]he Court’s review of an appeal is an 
adversarial process and pro-veteran rules under which the VA decides claims do not apply 
to the Court.”  United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, Court Process, 
available at http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/about/how_to_appeal/ 
HowtoAppealWithoutCourtProcess.cfm.   
 37. Bazalo v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 304, 312 (1996) (Steinberg, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part), rev’d sub nom. Bazalo v. West, 150 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating 
“about eighty percent”); VETERANS COURT ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 30 (stating sixty-
eight percent for 2009).  
 38. Act of July 4, 1864, §§ 12-13, 13 Stat. 387, 389.  Before that, fees were limited to 
$5.  Act of July 14, 1862, §§ 6-7, 12 Stat. 566, 568.  See Walters, 468 U.S. at 1323 
(addressing the $10 fee limit); Allen, Due Process and the American Veteran, supra note 30 
(describing the fee limitation).  Although most individuals filing notices of appeal at the 
Veterans Court are self-represented at the time of filing, they are not necessarily self-
represented at the VA.  The VA recognizes many service organizations that provide 
assistance to veterans pursuing a claim.  The recognized service organizations can be found 
on the VA website:  http://www.va.gov/vso/. 
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A. Gardner’s Precursor:  Boone’s Interpretive Canon  
Gardner’s Presumption (or rather its precursor) made its first official 
appearance in 1943, in Boone v. Lightner.39  In Boone, a serviceman in the 
military was sued to, among other things, “require him to account as trustee 
of a fund for his minor daughter.”40  Prior to the trial, the serviceman 
requested a continuance under the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act 
until after he completed his tour of duty.41  The trial judge denied the 
request.42  The serviceman lost the trial, and the court ordered him to pay 
$11,000.43  Importantly, there was no agency interpretation at issue in this 
case44—just two private parties disputing the meaning of a statute.45  
The serviceman appealed, arguing that the trial court should have 
granted his request for a continuance.46  The Supreme Court disagreed, 
holding that there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that his 
military service did not prevent him from being able to attend the trial and 
prepare a defense to the suit.47  However, at the conclusion of the Court’s 
analysis, the Court noted, without citing any authority and without 
explaining the import of its statement, that “[t]he Soldiers’ and Sailors’ 
Civil Relief Act is always to be liberally construed to protect those who 
have been obliged to drop their own affairs to take up the burdens of the 
nation.”48  The Court thereby created, or at least articulated for the first 
time, the interpretive canon that statutes benefitting military personnel 
should be liberally construed.  This interpretive canon would become the 
foundation for Gardner’s Presumption—which directs that veterans 
statutes should be construed not just liberally, but in the veteran’s favor.49   
A few years after Boone, the Supreme Court again referenced, without 
further explanation, Boone’s interpretive canon in Fishgold v. Sullivan 
                                                          
 39. 319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943).    
 40. Id. at 561–62.  He was trustee of a trust fund.  Id. at 562. 
 41. Id. at 563. 
 42. Id. at 564. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Therefore, Chevron would not have applied even had it existed. 
 45. Boone, 319 U.S. at 564–65.  The Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act provided: 
At any stage thereof any action or proceeding in any court in which a person in 
military service is involved, either as plaintiff or defendant, during the period of 
such service . . . may, in the discretion of the court in which it is pending . . . be 
stayed as provided in this Act, unless, in the opinion of the court, the ability of 
plaintiff to prosecute the action or the defendant to conduct his defense is not 
materially affected by reason of his military service. 
Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940, ch. 888, art. II, § 201, 54 Stat. 1178, 1181 
(1940). 
 46. Boone, 319 U.S. at 564. 
 47. Id. at 572. 
 48. Id. at 575.  Or, as Justice Douglas noted in a later case, “the Act must be read with 
an eye friendly to those who dropped their affairs to answer their country’s call.”  Le 
Maistre v. Leffers, 333 U.S. 1, 6 (1948). 
 49. Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 117–18 (1994). 
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Drydock & Repair Corp.50  In Fishgold, the Court had to determine 
whether a veteran who returned to his former job as a welder could be laid 
off during slow work periods or whether such a layoff would violate the 
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.51  As in Boone, there was no 
agency interpretation at issue in this case, but rather two private parties 
disputing the meaning of a statute.52  The Supreme Court adopted the 
employer’s interpretation, allowing the employer to lay off the employee 
due to slowed working conditions.53  In its analysis, the Court stated 
simply, “[t]his legislation is to be liberally construed for the benefit of 
those who left private life to serve their country in its hour of great need.”54  
The Court cited Boone but failed to elaborate or explain the interpretive 
canon.55  Also, as it had in Boone, the Court did not interpret the statute in 
the veteran’s favor despite the direction to construe such statutes liberally.56   
Those familiar with statutory interpretation have likely already noted the 
similarity of Boone’s interpretive canon with an oft-repeated canon of 
interpretation that instructs that remedial statutes should be construed 
liberally to further their “remedial” purposes.57  Boone’s interpretive canon 
is similar, if not identical, to the remedial interpretation canon, likely 
because veterans’ benefits statutes are remedial.58  Remedial statutes 
                                                          
 50. 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946).    
 51. Id. at 280.   
 52. Id. at 279–80 (describing private parties’ involvement in the dispute).  The statute at 
issue provided:   
In the case of any [military personnel] who, in order to perform such training and 
service, has left or leaves a position, other than a temporary position, in the employ 
of any employer . . . such employer shall restore such person to such position or to 
a position of like seniority, status, and pay unless the employer’s circumstances 
have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so . . . . 
Id. at 278 n.1 (quoting Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 885, 50 U.S.C. 
Appendix, § 301 et seq.). 
 53. Fishgold, 328 U.S. at 288. 
 54. Id. at 285 (citing Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943)).       
 55. See id. at 285 (asserting that legislation addressing honorable discharge of veterans 
is to be liberally construed in favor of veterans without addressing the foundation for this 
assertion). 
 56. See id. at 288 (finding no support for the petitioner’s assertion that he should be 
restored to his former position). 
 57. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403–04 (1991); Smith v. Brown, 35 F.3d 1516, 
1525 (Fed. Cir. 1994), superseded by statute, 38 U.S.C. § 7111 (1997), as recognized in 
Samish Indian Nation v. United States, 419 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  For example, in 
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995), the 
majority construed the word “take” broadly because the majority characterized the statute at 
issue to be “remedial.”  Id. at 704–08.  In contrast, writing for the dissent, Justice Scalia 
refused to interpret the word broadly because the statute impacted property rights and was, 
therefore, in derogation of common law.  Id. at 717–18 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Ne. 
Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 268 (1977) (reasoning that the broad 
language of the remedial statute indicates that the Court should take an expansive view of its 
coverage; Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 333 (1953) (announcing that the statute should be 
liberally interpreted to achieve its intent and avoid unfair results). 
 58. See Smith, 35 F.3d at 1525–26 (stating that veterans’ benefits statutes “clearly fall” 
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correct (or remedy) existing statutes, create new rights, or expand remedies 
that were otherwise unavailable at common law.59  Hence, the Court’s 
development of and lack of explanation for Boone’s interpretive canon is, 
perhaps, unsurprising.  Yet, in neither Boone nor Fishgold did the Court 
mention the remedial canon as its basis for creating Boone’s interpretive 
canon.  It is therefore unclear whether the Court believed that liberal 
interpretation was appropriate simply because veterans’ benefits statutes 
are remedial in nature or for some other, unstated reason.  In later cases, the 
Court identified two reasons for liberally construing veterans’ benefits 
statutes:  first, to express the nation’s gratitude for veterans’ sacrifice; and 
second, to help veterans overcome the adverse effects of service and 
reenter society more readily.60  Thus, liberally construing veterans’ benefits 
statutes furthers important policies—expressing gratitude and helping 
veterans.  Moreover, interpreting veterans’ benefits statutes liberally to 
achieve these purposes seems appropriate and consistent with the remedial 
canon and the veteran-friendly nature of veterans law.   
B. Boone’s Morph 
While Boone’s interpretive canon simply directed courts to construe 
veterans’ benefits statutes liberally, the Court transformed it from a liberal 
construction canon to a trump card that veterans could assert to defeat 
reasonable agency interpretations.  This section will explain how this 
transformation occurred. 
The Supreme Court began its transformation of Boone’s interpretive 
canon in King v. Saint Vincent’s Hospital.61  In that case, the Court had to 
determine whether a provision in the Veterans Reemployment Rights Act 
provided a member of the reserve services with an unlimited right to 
                                                          
in the remedial category); White v. Unites States, 102 F. Supp. 585, 586 (Ct. Cl. 1952) 
(citing Fishgold, 328 U.S. at 275; Boone, 319 U.S. at 561) (“As remedial legislation [the 
veterans statutes at issue] are to be liberally construed.”).   
 59. LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 251 (2008).  But see 
Ober United Travel Agency, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 135 F.3d 822, 825 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (stating “it is not at all apparent just what is and what is not remedial legislation; 
indeed all legislation might be thought remedial in some sense—even massive 
codifications.”). 
 60. Hooper v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 626 & n.3 (1985) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  In Hooper, Justice Stevens noted that “[the] simple interest [of] expressing . . . 
gratitude” for sacrifices veterans have made is “adequate justification” and further, “the fact 
that military service typically disrupts the normal progress of civilian employment justifies 
additional tangible benefits . . . to facilitate the reentry into civilian society.  A policy of 
providing special benefits for veterans’ past contributions has ‘always been deemed to be 
legitimate.’”  Id. (quoting Boone, 319 U.S. at 575); see also Regan v. Taxation With 
Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550–52 (1983) (“Our country has a longstanding 
policy of compensating veterans for their past contributions by providing them with 
numerous advantages.”). 
 61. 502 U.S. 215 (1991). 
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civilian reemployment.62  The reservist’s employer refused the reservist’s 
request for a three-year leave of absence, claiming the length  of time was 
unreasonable.63  As was true in Boone and Fishgold, this lawsuit did not 
involve an agency’s interpretation of a statute.64  Rather, the reservist’s 
employer sought a declaratory judgment that the statute should be read to 
include a reasonable limit on the length of time that the reservist’s position 
had to be kept open.65  Hence, here again two private parties disputed a 
statute’s meaning.66  Rejecting the employer’s interpretation,67 the Supreme 
Court found the text of the statute clear and free of any express limitation.68 
The Court could and should have ended its analysis there; it did not.  
Instead, in a footnote, the Court suggested in dictum that even if the 
employer had had a reasonable argument that the statute was ambiguous, 
the Court would have resolved any ambiguity in favor of the reservist.69  
The Court cited Fishgold for support for its assertion and noted that 
Congress was likely aware of this interpretive principle when it drafted the 
statute.70  But Fishgold did not support the Court’s assertion.  In Fishgold 
(and Boone), the Court said only that veterans’ benefits statutes should be 
liberally construed to further the dual purposes of expressing gratitude and 
of helping veterans assimilate back into civilian life.71   
In contrast, in King, the Court changed Boone’s interpretive canon from 
a liberal construction canon into a command that courts construe such 
                                                          
 62. Id. at 216. 
 63. Id. at 217. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 219. 
 66. The Act provided: 
[Any covered person] shall upon request be granted a leave of absence by such 
person’s employer for the period required to perform active duty for training or 
inactive duty training in the Armed Forces of the United States.  Upon such 
employee’s release from a period of such . . . [duty] . . . such employee shall be 
permitted to return to such employee’s position with such seniority, status, pay, and 
vacation as such employee would have had if such employee had not been absent 
for such purposes. 
Id. at 218 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 2024(d)(1988)).  
 67. The employer argued that the language in the statute—for the period required to 
perform active duty for training or inactive duty training—should be read to include a 
reasonableness limitation to protect employers generally from the burdens of holding jobs 
open indefinitely.  Id. at 218.  Lower courts agreed.  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits had engrafted a reasonableness requirement, while 
the Fourth Circuit declined to do so.  Id. 
 68. Id. at 222.  While the Court recognized the employer’s concerns, it did not feel 
comfortable “tinker[ing] with the statutory scheme [by] accord[ing] some significance to the 
burdens imposed on both employers and workers when long leaves of absence are the 
chosen means of guaranteeing eventual reemployment to military personnel.”  Id. at 220. 
 69. Id. at 220–21 n.9 (“[The Court] would ultimately read the provision in [the 
reservist’s] favor under the canon that provisions for benefits to members of the Armed 
Services are to be construed in the beneficiaries’ favor.”). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 288 (1946); Boone v. 
Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943). 
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statutes “in the [veterans’] favor.”72  Construing a statute liberally and 
construing a statute in a veteran’s favor are not identical; a statute can be 
liberally construed and still not favor the veteran, as the outcomes in both 
Boone and Fishgold demonstrated.73  Boone’s morph into a super-strong 
presumption thus started as dictum in this footnote from King. 
Had the Court simply created and then transformed Boone’s interpretive 
canon and stopped, applying it only to cases involving private litigants, 
there would be little to discuss in this Article.  Yet, with time, the Court 
expanded the application of this interpretive canon from those cases 
involving private litigants arguing over how to interpret a statute to all 
cases involving veterans and questions of statutory interpretation.74  Up and 
until the time King was decided, Boone’s interpretive canon had been 
applied only in cases involving individual litigants arguing about the 
interpretation of a statute.75  No agency interpretations were involved 
because VA benefit decisions were not yet reviewable.76  Thus, from the 
time the Supreme Court created Boone’s interpretive canon in 1943 until 
the time that Congress created the Veterans Court in 1988, no court applied 
the canon in a case in which a veteran and the VA disputed the 
interpretation of a statute.  With the arrival of Chevron deference in 1984 
and the creation of judicial review of VA decisions in 1988, the landscape 
changed. 
C. Chevron Deference 
In Chevron, the Supreme Court developed its famous, two-step 
framework for courts to use when evaluating an agency’s interpretation of a 
statute.77  The facts of the case are well-known and need not be repeated 
here.78  The issue for the Court was whether the Environmental Protection 
                                                          
 72. King, 502 U.S. at 221 n.9. 
 73. Fishgold, 328 U.S. at 285 (deciding against the veteran, but still applying Boone to 
state that legislation should be liberally construed for military personnel); Boone, 319 U.S. 
at 575 (finding against the veteran, but for the first time noting that statutes benefitting 
persons in the military should be liberally construed). 
 74. Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118–20 (1994). 
 75. See, e.g., Fishgold, 328 U.S. 275 (rejecting an honorably discharged veteran’s claim 
under the Selective Service Act). 
 76. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 77. 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
 78. Chevron involved a question about the Clean Air Act.  Id.  The provision of the Act 
at issue required permits when a plant wished to modify or build a “stationary source” of 
pollution.  Id. at 840.  “Stationary source” was not defined in the act.  Id. at 841.  Thus, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the agency in charge of administering the Act, had to 
interpret the term.  Id. at 843.  It issued two notice and comment regulations interpreting 
“stationary source.”  Id.  The first regulation defined “stationary source” as the construction 
or installation of any new or modified equipment that emitted air pollutants.  Id. at 840 n.2.  
But the following year, the EPA repealed that regulation and issued a new one that 
expanded the definition to encompass a plant-wide or “bubble concept” definition.  Id. at 
858.  The bubble concept interpretation allowed a plant to offset increased air pollutant 
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Agency’s interpretation of specific language in the Clean Air Act was 
valid.79  The Court upheld the agency’s interpretation, creating the two-step 
deference framework.80  Under the first step, a court should determine 
“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”81  
When applying this first step, courts should not defer to agencies.82  Rather, 
“[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory 
construction . . . .”83  Assuming Congress was unclear, then, pursuant to 
step two, a court must accept any “reasonable” agency interpretation, even 
if the court believes a different policy choice would be better.84  Chevron’s 
two-step analysis was an entirely new deference standard from the existing 
standard, one very deferential to agencies. 
The Court justified increasing the level of deference given to agencies 
for three reasons.  First, the Court reasoned that agency personnel are 
experts in their fields, whereas judges are not.85  Congress entrusts agencies 
to implement law in a particular area because of this expertise.86  Scientists 
and analysts working for the Food and Drug Administration, for example, 
are more knowledgeable about food safety and drug effectiveness than are 
judges.  Because agency personnel are specialists in their field, they are in a 
better position to implement effective public policy.87  The Court believed 
that judges were more limited in both their knowledge of complex topics 
and their method for gathering such information.88  While agencies can 
develop policy using a wide array of methods, courts are limited to the 
adversarial process.89  Therefore, deferring to the experts made sense to the 
Supreme Court.90  Second, Congress simply cannot legislate every detail of 
                                                          
emissions at one part of its plant so long as it reduced emissions at another part of the plant.  
Under the new interpretation, as long as total emissions at the plant remained constant, no 
permit was required.  Id. at 852.  Not surprisingly, environmentalists sued.  
 79. Id. at 852. 
 80. Id. at 842. 
 81. Id.  In other words, is Congress’s intent clear—however clarity may be discerned—
or is there a gap or ambiguity to be resolved?  According to the Court, clarity was to be 
determined by “employing traditional tools of statutory construction.”  Id. at 843 n.9. 
 82. Id. at 842–43.  
 83. Id. at 843 n.9. 
 84. Id. at 843–44.  Deference to the agency under Chevron’s second step is much 
higher. Indeed, if a litigant challenges an agency interpretation and loses at step one—
meaning the court finds ambiguity— that litigant will likely lose the case. According to one 
empirical study from 1995–1996, agencies prevail at step one forty-two percent of the time 
and at step two eighty-nine percent of the time.  Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron:  
An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON 
REG. 1, 31 (1998). 
 85. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 865. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 866. 
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a comprehensive regulatory scheme.91  Gaps and ambiguities are inevitable; 
when Congress delegates responsibility for the regulatory area to an 
agency, that agency must fill and resolve these gaps and ambiguities.92  In 
Chevron, the Court presumed that when Congress leaves gaps and 
ambiguities, it impliedly delegates to the agency the authority to resolve 
them.93  Finally, administrative officials, unlike federal judges, have a 
political constituency to which they are accountable and thus, the Court 
reasoned, federal judges “have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices 
made by [administrative officials].”94 
After Chevron, deference became an “all-or-nothing grant of power from 
Congress.”95  Either Congress was clear when it drafted the statute and no 
deference would be due to the agency’s interpretation, or Congress was 
unclear when it drafted the statute and complete deference would be due to 
the agency’s reasonable interpretation.96  If this two-step deference 
standard applies, then there is simply no place for King’s “tie goes to the 
Veteran” presumption.   
D. Gardner’s Presumption 
Ten years after deciding Chevron, the Supreme Court referred to its King 
dictum in Brown v. Gardner, a case that made “Gardner’s Presumption” 
common parlance in veterans law.97  For the first time, the Court used 
Boone’s interpretive canon (as reformulated in King) in a case involving a 
challenge to an agency’s—in this case, the VA’s—interpretation of a 
statute.98  Yet, the Court seemed oblivious to the conflict between its 
direction in this case and its direction in Chevron.  
Gardner’s facts are simple.  Brown, a veteran, had back surgery in a VA 
facility for a medical condition unrelated to his military service.99  After the 
surgery, he developed pain and weakness in one leg; he sought disability 
benefits under 38 U.S.C. § 1151, which provided compensation for “‘an 
injury or an aggravation of an injury’ that occurs ‘as the result of 
hospitalization, medical or surgical treatment’” not attributable to the 
veteran’s “willful misconduct.”100  The VA had issued a regulation 
interpreting this statute to cover an injury only if it arose from fault or 
                                                          
 91. Id. at 843–44. 
 92. Id. at 843. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 866.   
 95. Linda D. Jellum, Chevron’s Demise:  A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to 
Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 739 (2007) [hereinafter Chevron’s Demise]. 
 96. Id.   
 97. 513 U.S. 115 (1994). 
 98. Id. at 117–18. 
 99. Id. at 116. 
 100. Id. (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994)). 
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accident on the part of the VA.101  Pursuant to this regulation, the VA 
denied Brown’s claim, stating that the statute, as interpreted by the 
regulation, required “fault-or-accident.”102  The Veterans Court reversed, 
finding that the statute did not contain such a requirement.103  The Federal 
Circuit affirmed.104 
The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the regulation was 
inconsistent with the plain language of the statute.105  While the Court 
should have applied Chevron’s two steps to analyze whether to defer to the 
VA’s interpretation in its regulation, the Court did not do so explicitly.106  
Rather, the Court simply looked to the text of the statute, found the 
language clear and found that language inconsistent with the VA’s 
regulation.107  Essentially, the Court applied Chevron’s first step and 
stopped, but the Court certainly did not explain that it was applying 
Chevron.108   
After finding the language clear, the Court stated in dictum that even if 
the government could show ambiguity⎯which the government could 
not⎯any “interpretive doubt [was] to be resolved in the veteran’s favor.”109  
In so doing, the Court cited the footnote dictum from King.110  The Court 
thus transformed Boone’s interpretive canon from a directive to courts to 
interpret veterans’ benefits statutes liberally into a directive to courts to 
resolve any interpretive doubt in the veteran-litigant’s favor—even in the 
face of a contrary agency interpretation.111  In essence, with its dicta in both 
King and Gardner, the Court created a “tie-to-the-veteran” presumption 
with little explanation or awareness of the potential conflict with Chevron.   
Importantly, Boone, Fishgold, and King did not involve an agency 
interpretation of a statute.112  Also, none of the subsequent Supreme Court 
cases in which the majority cited either Boone or Fishgold involved VA 
                                                          
 101. Id. at 117 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.358(c)(3) (1993)). 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 118–20. 
 106. Indeed, the first time the Court cites Chevron is toward the end of the opinion, when 
the Court quotes another case, Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 409 
(1993), which quotes Chevron.  Id. at 120. Only in the very last paragraph does the Court 
cite Chevron for justification for the Court’s refusal to defer.  Id. at 122. 
 107. See id. at 117–20 (dismissing the VA’s claim that “injury” includes a fault 
requirement). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 118. 
 110. Id.  
 111. See id. at 117–18. 
 112. See King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 217 (1991) (analyzing a hospital’s 
interpretation of a statute); Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp, 328 U.S. 275, 279 
(1946) (analyzing an arbitrator’s interpretation of a statute); Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 
561 (1943) (analyzing a trial court’s interpretation of a statute). 
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interpretations of statutes.113  Rather, all involved situations in which the 
veteran114 sued or was sued by a private individual or entity115 or by a city 
or state government.116  Perhaps in these situations, Gardner’s Presumption 
was appropriate.117  However, when a federal agency like the VA interprets 
a statute, Chevron should come into play.  The Supreme Court failed to 
recognize this conflict in Gardner, and for many years the lower courts 
similarly failed to notice it. 
While it is not exactly clear why the Supreme Court modified Gardner’s 
Presumption from its liberal construction beginnings to its super-strong 
formulation, the history of judicial review in this area offers a potential 
explanation.  When the Court decided Gardner in 1994, judicial review of 
VA decisions was only six years old.118  Possibly, the Court developed 
Gardner’s Presumption to help ease the transition to judicial review and to 
help maintain the pro-claimant nature of veterans law.  The Presumption 
might have served as a transitional doctrine; it was easy to apply and 
favored veterans.  It gave both the VA and the Veterans Court an easy 
default.  However, to the extent that the Presumption was ever to have 
super-strength, the time has now passed as the VA has been subject to 
judicial review for nearly twenty-five years.119  Moreover, as this Article 
discusses below, Gardner’s Presumption has morphed well beyond this 
possible purpose.  
III. GARDNER’S PRESUMPTION IN THE COURTS 
For a pro-claimant, young judicial system, Gardner’s Presumption likely 
appeared as an easy, bright-line, veteran-friendly interpretive rule.  Thus, 
shortly after the Supreme Court decided Gardner, the Veterans Court and 
Federal Circuit cited the Presumption relatively regularly, although they 
                                                          
 113. See supra notes 102–104.  
 114. But see Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 542, 550–
51 (1983) (discussing that nonprofit organization not representing veterans sought 
declaratory judgment that it qualified for tax exempt status after its application was denied 
by Internal Revenue Service).  
 115. See, e.g., King, 502 U.S. at 215 (dealing with a declaratory judgment brought by a 
private employer to determine whether employer had to hold open job for military employee 
who was to be stationed for three years); Ala. Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581, 582 (1977) 
(involving suit between veteran and private employer to obtain credit with respect to 
pension plan for the time veteran spent in the military); Le Maistre v. Leffers, 333 U.S. 1, 3 
(1948) (involving suit between veteran and new land owner to set aside tax deed). 
 116. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 514 (1993) (involving suit of Army 
officer on active duty against town and property’s purchasers to quiet title); Dameron v. 
Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322, 323 (1953) (involving suit between Army officer and City and 
County of Denver). 
 117. See infra Part V.B. 
 118. See Helfer, supra note 24, at 162–65 (discussing the creation of the Veterans’ Court 
in 1988, which allowed for VA decisions to be reviewed).  
 119. Id. 
JELLUM.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/2/2011  5:18 PM 
2011] RECONCILING BROWN V. GARDNER’S PRESUMPTION 75 
did not seem to know exactly what to do with it.  This next section explores 
how the Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit used Gardner’s 
Presumption until they recognized that it conflicted with Chevron.   
A. The Veterans Court’s Use of Gardner’s Presumption 
While Gardner’s Presumption quickly became a legend in veterans 
jurisprudence, the Veterans Court used it inconsistently.  The court 
occasionally used the Presumption as the primary support for its 
holdings.120  More habitually, the court used the Presumption as 
supplemental support for its holdings,121 simply noting the Presumption in 
passing.122  Finally, the court often failed to mention the Presumption at all 
when the court’s holding supported the VA’s position rather than the 
veteran’s position.123  Some examples of each of these uses follow. 
1. Gardner’s Presumption as primary support 
While rare, the Veterans Court has used Gardner’s Presumption as 
primary support for its holding; yet, the court commonly cites the 
Presumption with little analysis or explanation.  For example, in Carpenter 
v. Principi,124 the issue for the court was whether an attorney could recover 
both a thirty percent contingency fee and an Equal Access to Justice Act 
(“EAJA”) award for work on the same case.125  The EAJA allows litigants, 
including veterans, to receive attorneys’ fees and expenses when they 
prevail in litigation against the government so long as they meet certain 
requirements.126  The VA had held that this dual award was “excessive and 
                                                          
 120. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 64, 76 (2001) (holding that an attorney 
could not recover contingency fees and Equal Access to Justice Fees for one case).  
 121. See, e.g., Nielson v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 56, 59 (2009) (using Gardner’s 
Presumption as supplemental support), aff’d 607 F.3d 802 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Osman v. 
Peake, 22 Vet. App. 252, 259 (2008) (indicating that even if the issue were a “close one,” 
the court was required to resolve any interpretive doubt “in the veteran’s favor” (citing 
Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 120 (1994))); Otero-Castro v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 375, 
380 (2002) (applying Gardner’s Presumption to resolve ambiguity in favor of veteran); 
McCormick v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 39, 47 (2000) (citing Gardner’s Presumption to support 
court’s holding that Secretary had authority to interpret 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a) to assist 
veterans in making a well-grounded claim). 
 122. E.g., Jackson v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 27, 34 (2009) (noting the presumption, but 
not discussing it); Hartness v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 216, 221 (2006) (noting only that the 
court was “mindful that any ambiguity in interpretation must be resolved in the veteran’s 
favor”); accord Nielson v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 56, 59 (2009), aff’d 607 F.3d 802, 808 
(Fed. Cir. 2010); Abbey v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 282, 290 (2003). 
 123. See, e.g., Theiss v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 204, 206 (2004) (failing to mention the 
presumption other than to note that the veteran mentioned it); Gomez v. Principi, 17 Vet. 
App. 369, 375 (2003) (ignoring Gardner’s Presumption altogether, although the  
concurrence did refer to it). 
 124. 15 Vet. App. 64 (2001). 
 125. Id. at 69. 
 126. Applicants must meet the following requirements:  (1) show that they were the 
prevailing party; (2) show that they are financially eligible for the award; (3) allege that the 
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unreasonable.”127 
At issue for the Veterans Court was whether the legal work the attorney 
performed before the court and the legal work the attorney subsequently 
performed after the veteran’s case was remanded to the VA were “the same 
work.”128  If they were the same work, then the double award was 
impermissible because the court “would improperly be allowing the EAJA 
fee to enhance the [attorney’s] fee, rather than to reimburse the veteran for 
the cost of representation.”129   
Without first finding the language in the statute to be ambiguous and 
without offering any explanation as to why Gardner’s Presumption applied 
when the EAJA is a generally applicable statute and not a veterans benefit 
statute, the court cited Gardner’s Presumption simply to support its holding 
that whenever an attorney represents a client in a claim, all work on that 
claim should be considered the same work.130  The court reasoned only that 
“[i]f there is any room for interpretive doubt as to what constitutes the 
‘same work’ for the purposes of EAJA, such doubt must be resolved in the 
veterans’ favor.”131  The court offered no further analysis. 
The dissents criticized the majority’s lack of analysis.  Chief Judge 
Kramer noted that “the majority . . . fails to provide adequate analysis and 
legal support for its holding . . . .”132  Judge Steinberg lamented, “[t]he 
opinion’s principal stated justification for the interpretive leap of equating 
‘same work’ with ‘same claim’ seems to be a citation to Brown v. 
Gardner . . . .”133  In addition, Judge Steinberg questioned whether 
Gardner’s Presumption had any applicability when there was no 
interpretive doubt or ambiguity.134  In short, the dissents noted that 
Gardner’s Presumption provided no support for the majority’s holding.135  
The majority offered no response to these criticisms.  Notably, Chevron 
was not an issue in this case. 
Similarly, the Veterans Court used Gardner’s Presumption as primary 
support in two other cases in which Chevron did not apply.  In the first 
                                                          
government’s position was not substantially justified; and (4) provide an itemized statement 
of the fees sought.  Bazalo v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 304, 308, rev’d sub nom. Bazalo v. West, 
150 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Lematta v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 504 (1996)). 
 127. Carpenter, 15 Vet. App. at 66. 
 128. Id. at 72.  (citing Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, 
106 Stat. 4506 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000)). 
 129. Id. at 76. 
 130. Carpenter, 15 Vet. App. at 76. 
 131. Id. at 76 (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)).  The interpretation 
was veteran-friendly because the overpayment was returned to the veteran.  Id. at 66. 
 132. Id. at 94 (Kramer, C.J., dissenting). 
 133. Id. at 90 (Steinberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
 134. Id. 
 135. See supra notes 132–134 and accompanying text. 
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case, Otero-Castro v. Principi,136 the court reviewed the VA’s denial of a 
veteran’s request for an increased disability rating for his service-connected 
heart disease.137  The facts are more complicated than merit discussion 
here.  In short, the court found the applicable regulation ambiguous, 
rejected the VA’s interpretation, and adopted the veteran’s interpretation 
solely because “interpretive doubt is to be resolved in favor of the 
claimant . . . .”138  Because the VA had interpreted its own regulation in this 
case, rather than a statute, Chevron did not apply.139  The court assumed, 
but did not explain, that Gardner’s Presumption, which applies to 
interpretations of ambiguous statutes, should also apply to interpretations 
of ambiguous regulations.140  While there is good reason to believe that 
Gardner’s Presumption should not apply in cases evaluating the VA’s 
interpretation of its regulations,141 the court cited Gardner’s Presumption as 
the primary support for its holding.142   
In the second case, Cottle v. Principi,143 the issue was whether a veteran 
who had been injured while working as an employee of the Dallas transit 
system while receiving VA rehabilitation employment services was injured 
in “the pursuit of a course of vocational rehabilitation . . . .”144  Neither the 
statute nor the implementing regulations defined the italicized phrase.145  
Moreover, the legislative history was similarly not illuminating.146  
                                                          
 136. 16 Vet. App. 375 (2002). 
 137. Id. at 376. 
 138. Id. at 382 (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)).   
 139. Traditionally, courts defer almost completely to an agency’s interpretation of its 
own regulation because the agency wrote the regulation.  See generally JELLUM, MASTERING 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 59 at 227–29 (explaining that agencies have the 
experience and flexibility necessary to properly interpret their own regulations).  In 1945, 
the Supreme Court held that an agency’s interpretation of its regulation would have 
“controlling weight unless it [was] plainly erroneous.”  Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand 
Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).   This high level of deference should come as no surprise 
since it was the agency that drafted the regulation in the first place.  The Court reasoned that 
when Congress delegates the authority to promulgate regulations, it also delegates the 
authority to interpret those regulations.  Id.  Such power is a necessary corollary to the 
former.  This substantial level of deference is generally known as either Seminole Rock or 
Auer deference.  The latter term refers to the Supreme Court case of Auer v. Robbins, 519 
U.S. 452 (1997), which followed Chevron and confirmed that Seminole Rock deference had 
survived Chevron.  Auer, 519 U.S. at 461–63.   
 140. Otero-Castro, 16 Vet. App. at 382. 
 141. If an agency’s interpretation of its regulation must be “plainly wrong” before the 
court can reject that interpretation, there can be little place for Gardner’s Presumption; the 
VA’s interpretation would have to be plainly wrong before it was rejected.  Thus, Gardner’s 
Presumption not only conflicts with Chevron deference, it also conflicts with Auer 
deference.  Yet, in Otero-Castro, the Veterans Court rejected the VA’s interpretation 
without mentioning or even citing Auer.  Id.  
 142. Id.    
 143. 14 Vet. App. 329 (2001). 
 144. Id. at 332 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994)). 
 145. Id. at 332–34 (citing 38 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 3101 & 38 C.F.R. §§ 21.210, 21.268, 
21.283 (2000)). 
 146. Id. at 334. 
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Chevron deference was not appropriate in this case because the only VA 
interpretation of the statue at issue was made in a Precedent Opinion issued 
by the VA General Counsel.147  Chevron is not appropriate when agencies 
interpret statutes in this manner.148  The general counsel memorandum 
concluded that a “participant who is receiving only a period of employment 
services while engaged in post-training employment is not pursuing ‘a 
course of vocational rehabilitation’ within the meaning of [the statute] so as 
to qualify for disability compensation benefits under that section.”149  
While acknowledging that interpretations contained within VA regulations 
would be entitled to deference, the court correctly noted that it owed no 
deference to “an opinion prepared exclusively for adjudication or litigation 
of a particular claim . . . .”150  The court then rejected the VA’s 
interpretation, citing Gardner’s Presumption.151  The court was blunt:  
although the general counsel had acknowledged that the statute could be 
read broadly to cover the veteran’s injury, she chose to interpret the statute 
narrowly.152  The court rejected her choice and chastised her for “fail[ing] 
to discuss or consider Gardner at all.”153   
Importantly, in this case the Veterans Court expanded the application of 
Gardner’s Presumption beyond the courtroom.  Specifically, the court 
stressed that Gardner’s Presumption required not only courts but also the 
VA to “resolv[e] any interpretative doubt in favor of the veteran . . . .”154  
For the first time, the court suggested that Gardner’s Presumption placed 
an affirmative duty on the VA, in addition to or perhaps instead of the 
court, to resolve interpretive doubt in favor of the veteran before a case was 
even litigated.155  While intriguing, this expansion of Gardner’s 
Presumption has yet to reappear in the court’s jurisprudence; yet, as I will 
explain below, this approach to Gardner’s Presumption resolves the 
conflict and balances the competing interests.156 
Despite these three cases, the Veterans Court rarely uses Gardner’s 
Presumption as the primary support for its holdings.  More commonly, the 
court refers to the Presumption merely as additional, or back-up, support.   
                                                          
 147. Id. at 331.   
 148. For a discussion of when Chevron applies and when it does not, see generally, 
JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 59, at 225–26.  
 149. Cottle, 14 Vet. App. at 331 (quoting VA Gen Coun. Prec. 14-97 (Apr. 7, 1997)). 
 150. Id. at 335. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 336. 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id.  
 155. See id. (tasking the VA General Counsel to “discuss or consider Gardner” prior to 
litigation). 
 156. See infra Part V.  
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2. Gardner’s Presumption as supplemental support 
The Veterans Court used Gardner’s Presumption as supplemental 
support for its holding favoring the veteran-litigants in a number of cases.  
For example, in Allen v. Brown,157 the court had to determine whether the 
VA properly denied benefits to a veteran who claimed that a service-related 
injury to his right knee had aggravated non-service-connected injuries in 
his left knee and hips.158  The issue for the court was whether the term 
“disability” in 38 U.S.C. § 1110 included non-service-related injuries 
aggravated by service-related injuries.159  The statute provided that veterans 
would receive compensation for “disability resulting from personal injury 
suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, or for aggravation of a 
preexisting injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty . . . .160  
Additionally, a VA regulation interpreting this statute provided:  
“[d]isability which is proximately due to or the result of a service-
connected disease or injury shall be service connected.”161  Because 
“disability” was not clearly defined in either the statute or the regulation to 
include or to exclude aggravation of non-service-related injuries, the court 
correctly interpreted the statute without giving any deference to the 
agency’s regulation.   
Instead, the court turned to its holding in an earlier case, Hunt v. 
Derwinski,162  in which the court found the VA’s interpretation of the term 
“disability” for another statute to be reasonable.163  The court adopted the 
same interpretation of “disability” for both statutes.164  Notably, the court’s 
reasoning did not automatically flow from the Hunt holding.165  Thus, to 
further support its interpretation, the court cited Gardner’s Presumption.166  
Without discussion, the court simply noted that “resolving doubt between 
                                                          
 157. 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995). 
 158. Id. at 440. 
 159. The Veterans Court had actually interpreted the statute to deny coverage for 
aggravated injuries in an earlier case, Leopoldo v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 216, 218–19 (1993), 
but that opinion directly contradicted the holding in an earlier case decided by the Veterans 
Court, Tobin v. Derwinski, 2 Vet App. 34 (1991), in which the court had held that 
aggravated injuries were covered.  Id. at 39.  To resolve the conflicting case law, the Court 
decided the Allen case en banc.  Allen, 7 Vet. App. at 445–46. 
 160. Id. at 446 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2000)). 
 161. Id. at 446 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a) (1994)). 
 162. 1 Vet. App. 292 (1991). 
 163. Allen, 7 Vet. App. at 447 (citing Hunt v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 292 (1991) 
(interpreting 38 U.S.C. § 1153)). 
 164. Id. at 448 (citing Hunt, 1 Vet. App. at 296).  According to the Allen and Hunt 
courts, the VA’s definition was reasonable because it furthered the purpose of the veterans’ 
compensation law, which rates different injuries based upon diminished earning capacity.  
Id. 
 165. In Allen, the court concluded that because statutes should be interpreted in statutory 
context and because these two statutes (§ 1110 and § 1153) were located within the same 
title of the code, the same definition should apply to both.  Id. 
 166. Id.  
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[the two interpretations available in this case] requires that such doubt be 
resolved in favor . . . of the veteran.”167  Thus, in Allen, Gardner’s 
Presumption served as a back-up citation for the court’s primary reasoning. 
Similarly, in Davenport v. Brown,168 the Veterans Court referred to 
Gardner’s Presumption as an afterthought to its primary reasoning.  In that 
case, the court had to determine whether a vocational rehabilitation benefits 
entitlement statute (38 U.S.C. § 3102) required a veteran’s service-
connected disability to “materially contribute” to the veteran’s employment 
handicap.169  In other words, the court considered whether the statute 
required a causal connection between the injury and the inability to work.  
The VA had, by regulation, interpreted the statute to require this causal 
connection.170  Because the VA had interpreted the statute by regulation, 
Chevron applied.  Pursuant to Chevron’s first step, the court rejected the 
VA’s regulation as contrary to the clear statutory text.171  The court then 
bolstered this reasoning by stating, “[s]econd, even were we to find any 
ambiguity, which we do not, the Supreme Court has counseled strongly that 
‘interpretative doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor.’”172  As it had 
in Allen, the Veterans Court offered no further reasoning, explanation, or 
elaboration for how Gardner’s Presumption dictated the outcome in 
Davenport.  Importantly, had the court found ambiguity, the court would 
have been obligated under Chevron’s second step to adopt the agency’s 
interpretation, assuming it was reasonable.173  Nevertheless, the potential 
conflict between Chevron and Gardner went unnoticed. 
These cases and many others174 show that the Veterans Court regularly 
referred to Gardner’s Presumption as an afterthought, using “even-if” 
language, and offered little if any analysis of how the Presumption applied 
to the facts of each case.  Essentially, the court offered no more than its 
agreement with the veteran’s interpretation as proof that it was correctly 
applying Gardner’s Presumption.175  Likely, when the court had already 
                                                          
 167. Id. (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)). 
 168. 7 Vet. App. 476 (1995). 
 169. Id. at 477. 
 170. Id. at 480 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 21.51(c)(2) (1994)). 
 171. Id. at 481. 
 172. Id. at 484 (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)). 
 173. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 
(1984) (stating that if Congress has not addressed a precise question, statutory interpretation 
falls to the relevant agency).  
 174. E.g., Chandler v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 23, 28 (2010) (mentioning Gardner’s 
Presumption in one sentence as a presumption to be mindful of); Osman v. Peake, 22 Vet. 
App. 252, 259 (2008) (stating that “even if” the question were a close one, Gardner required 
the court to find in the veteran’s favor); accord Ramsey v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 16, 35 
(2006); Smith v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 63, 78 (2005); Kilpatrick v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 
1, 6 (2002); Ryan v. West, 13 Vet. App. 151, 157 (1999); Dippel v. West, 12 Vet. App. 466, 
472 (1999); Green v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 111, 118 (1997). 
 175. See cases cited supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
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resolved the issue in the veteran’s favor, Gardner’s Presumption lent 
additional supportive reasoning for the court’s holding, so the court felt no 
need to explain its citation further.  
3. Gardner’s Presumption missing from the analysis 
When the Veterans Court resolved the issue in the VA’s favor rather 
than the veteran’s favor, however, the court often ignored the Presumption 
altogether.176  For example, in Morton v. West,177 a veteran appealed a VA 
decision that held the veteran’s claims were not well-grounded.178  The 
veteran alleged on appeal that the VA was required to help him develop 
facts to support his case even though he did not submit a well-grounded 
claim.179  Yet, the statute in effect at the time was very clear to the contrary.  
The statute provided:   
(a) Except when otherwise provided . . . a person who submits a claim 
for benefits under a law administered by the secretary shall have the 
burden of submitting evidence sufficient to justify a belief by a fair and 
impartial individual that the claim is well grounded.  The Secretary shall 
assist such a claimant in developing facts pertinent to the claims. 
(b) . . . .  Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as shifting from 
the claimant to the Secretary the burden specified in subsection (a) of 
this section.180 
The Secretary, interpreting this statute by regulation, had obligated the 
VA to help a claimant regardless of whether the claimant had submitted a 
well-grounded claim.  Specifically, one regulation indicated that “‘[i]t is 
the obligation of VA to assist a claimant in developing the facts pertinent to 
the claim . . . .’”181  Another regulation provided that “‘[a]lthough it is the 
responsibility of any person filing a claim . . . the [VA] shall assist a 
claimant in developing the facts pertinent to his or her claim.’”182  
Additionally, VA policy statements further obligated the VA to help in all 
                                                          
 176. E.g., McGrath v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 28 (2000).  In McGrath, the majority held 
that a veteran could use medical evidence submitted after a claim was filed to establish an 
earlier effective date for compensation.  Id. at 35–36.  In so holding, the majority vacated 
the Board’s determination and remanded, but did not cite Gardner.  Judge Steinberg 
concurred in the holding but not the reasoning and mentioned Gardner’s Presumption in his 
analysis.  Id. at 38 n.1, 39 (Steinberg, J., concurring and dissenting); accord Henderson v. 
Peake, 22 Vet. App. 217, 221 (2008) (dismissing appeal without citing Gardner).   
 177. 12 Vet. App. 477 (1999). 
 178. Id. at 478.  Parenthetically, in 2000, the Veterans’ Claims Assistance Act repealed 
this “well-grounded” requirement for claims, restated VA’s duty to assist the claimant to 
develop all evidence pertinent to the claim, and required VA to inform the claimant at each 
step of the claims process as to what the VA will do and what the claimant must do to 
develop evidence sufficient to determine the merits of the claim.  38 U.S.C. § 5103(a).  
 179. Morton, 12 Vet. App. at 479–80.  Even though the veteran had not properly raised 
this issue on appeal, the court heard it.  Id. at 479–80. 
 180. Id. at 480 (emphasis added) (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a), (b) (1994)). 
 181. Id. at 481 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.103 (1998)). 
 182. Id. (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (1998)). 
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cases, regardless of whether the claim was well-grounded.183   
The issue for the Veterans Court was whether the VA’s interpretation, as 
contained in both the regulations and the policy statements, was 
controlling.  Applying the first step of Chevron, the court found the statute 
was clear:  the VA was obligated to assist only those claimants who 
submitted well-grounded claims.184  For this reason, the court held that the 
VA had no authority to promulgate the inconsistent regulations and policy 
statements.185  Thus, the court held against the veteran; in so doing, the 
court failed to mention Gardner’s Presumption.  The court ignored the 
Presumption even though the court quoted another part of the Gardner case 
to support its statement that a regulation that “‘flies against the plain 
language of the statutory text, exempts courts from any obligation to defer 
to it.’”186  It is unclear why the court failed to mention Gardner’s 
Presumption.  The court likely failed to do so because the statute was not 
ambiguous at Chevron’s step one.  However, it would have been helpful for 
the court to note that fact, as it did in Davenport v. Brown.187 
Similarly, in Bazalo v. Brown,188 the EAJA was again at issue.189  
Remember that the EAJA allows litigants to receive attorneys’ fees and 
expenses when they prevail in litigation against the government.190  The 
issue in Bazalo was whether the attorney-applicants had to submit a 
complete, non-defective application within the thirty-day time frame to 
receive compensation or whether they could correct a defective application 
after the thirty-day time frame.191  The Veterans Court held that a defective 
application could not be corrected after the thirty-day time frame.192  In so 
holding, the majority relied on another canon of statutory interpretation, 
namely that “waiver[s] of the sovereign immunity of the United States . . . 
are to be strictly construed in the government’s favor.”193  The majority did 
not mention Gardner’s Presumption.  Again, it is unclear why, but one 
                                                          
 183. Id. at 481 (citing Manual M21-1, Part III ¶ 1.03(a)). 
 184. Id. at 485. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 122 (1994)). 
 187. See 7 Vet. App. 476, 481 (1995) (recognizing that the “proper starting point” is to 
examine the language of the statute, and that consideration of the matter ends when 
congressional intent is clear). 
 188. 9 Vet. App. 304 (1996), rev’d sub nom. Bazalo v. West, 150 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
 189. Id.  Because the VA is not the agency administering the EAJA, the VA would not 
be entitled to Chevron deference for its interpretations of the EAJA.  At best, it would be 
entitled to Skidmore deference.  See Linda D. Jellum, The United States Court of Appeals 
for Veterans’ Claims:  Has it Mastered Chevron’s Step Zero?, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 67, 85–
86 (2011) [hereinafter Chevron’s Step Zero].   
 190. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (describing relevant requirements for 
receiving attorneys’ fees). 
 191. Bazalo, 9 Vet. App. at 308. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. (citing Grivois v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 100, 101 (1994)). 
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possibility for the omission is that the court’s choice of interpretive 
canon—that waivers of immunity be strictly construed—directly 
contradicted Gardner’s Presumption.194   
In contrast to the majority, the dissent did refer to Gardner’s 
Presumption:  “Not only does [the majority’s] approach frustrate the will of 
Congress in expressly making the EAJA applicable to this Court, but it also 
contradicts the Supreme Court’s recent charge that in construing a statute 
‘interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor.’”195  The dissent 
disagreed with the majority’s decision to adopt a “narrow” interpretation of 
the statute when balanced with “the interests of veterans.”196  Thus, the 
majority completely ignored Gardner’s Presumption, which the dissent 
found dispositive. 
Similarly, in Wright v. Gober,197 the Veterans Court did not mention 
Gardner’s Presumption when it held for the VA.  The issue for the court 
was the correct effective date for a veteran’s disability rating.198  The 
veteran filed a claim shortly after he was discharged in 1954, but the VA 
denied the claim.199  In 1990, the veteran applied to reopen the 1954 claim; 
the VA granted this award with an effective date of 1990.200  The veteran 
appealed, arguing that the effective date should be 1954.201  The relevant 
statute provided that “[t]he effective date of an award of disability 
compensation to a veteran shall be the day following the date of the 
veteran’s discharge of release if application therefor is received within one 
year from such date of discharge or release.”202  The majority found this 
language clear and supportive of the VA’s interpretation because although 
the veteran’s initial claim was filed within one year of his discharge, it was 
denied, and the subsequent claim was filed 35 years later.203  Although the 
majority again quoted the Gardner case for a different point, the majority 
did not mention Gardner’s Presumption.204  The majority could have 
                                                          
 194. Arguably, Gardner’s Presumption was inapplicable because the EAJA is not a 
veterans’ benefits statute (it is a generally applicable statute), but the courts have never 
recognized this limitation.    
 195. Bazalo, 9 Vet. App. at 314–15 (Steinberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994)). 
 196. Id. at 315.  The dissent rejected the majority’s reliance on the strict construction 
canon, saying that such reliance was inapplicable when the government by statute had 
waived its immunity, as it had with the EAJA.  Id.  In other words, once Congress has 
waived immunity, then courts should not “‘assume the authority to narrow the waiver’” 
even further.  Id.  (quoting U.S. v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117–18 (1979)). 
 197. 10 Vet. App. 343 (1997). 
 198. Id. at 345. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 346 (quoting 38 U.S.C. 5110(b)(1)(1994)). 
 203. Id. at 346–47. 
 204. Id. at 347. 
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helpfully indicated that the Presumption was inapplicable because the 
statute was unambiguous; however, the majority provided no such 
explanation.  In contrast, the dissent cited Gardner’s Presumption as 
additional support for its plain meaning interpretation of the statute.205 
These cases illustrate that when the Veterans Court interprets a statute in 
a way that is contrary to the veteran’s position, the court routinely omits 
any discussion of Gardner’s Presumption.  Often when the court fails to 
mention Gardner’s Presumption, the court first finds the statute 
unambiguous.206  When the statute is clear, Gardner’s Presumption is 
inapplicable,207 so the court’s approach is arguably sound.  However, the 
court has inconsistently explained why the Presumption is inapplicable.208  
Moreover, it is unlikely the statutes are as clear as the court suggests; 
indeed, in each of these cases, the dissent found the statutes ambiguous and 
turned to Gardner’s Presumption.209  At a minimum, it would be helpful to 
know why the majority ignored a presumption the dissent found 
dispositive. 
In sum, a review of all the Veterans Court’s cases until 2002—when the 
court first acknowledged the conflict between Gardner’s Presumption and 
Chevron—demonstrates that the court used Gardner’s Presumption 
inconsistently, offering little guidance to future litigants.  First, the court 
does not distinguish between those cases involving agency interpretations 
subject to Chevron deference and those not subject to Chevron deference.  
Second, the court most commonly cited the Presumption simply as back-up 
support, with little to no explanation of how the Presumption applied in a 
given case.  Finally, when the court agreed with the VA or found the 
statutory language at issue clear, the court failed to mention the 
Presumption altogether.  This inconsistency is hardly surprising, however, 
for it comes from a young court struggling to apply incompatible Supreme 
Court precedents.  
                                                          
 205. Id. at 351 (Kramer, J., dissenting) (noting that a VA position interpreting ambiguity 
would have to account for Gardner); see also Brown v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 290, 297 
(2007) (holding for VA and not mentioning Gardner’s Presumption). 
 206. See, e.g., Wright v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 343, 351 (1997) (Kramer, J. dissenting) 
(supporting a plain meaning interpretation of the statute). 
 207. See Terry v. Principi, 340 F.3d 1378, 1384 & n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (rejecting 
Gardner as justification where language was clear and unambiguous). 
 208. Compare Davenport v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 476 (1995) (explaining why the 
Presumption did not apply) with Wright, 10 Vet. App. at 437 (failing to recognize Gardner’s 
relevance). 
 209. See Wright, 10 Vet. App. at 349–50 (noting that discerning the plain language 
requires the dual consideration of the language and the structure of the statute); Bazalo v. 
Brown, 9 Vet. App. 304, 316 (1996) (Steinberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(finding no plain meaning in the content requirements of EAJA), rev’d sub nom. Bazalo v. 
West, 150 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1998).   
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B. The Federal Circuit’s Use of Gardner’s Presumption 
The Federal Circuit has limited authority to review interpretations of 
statutes made by the Veterans Court;210 thus, the Federal Circuit must also 
interpret veterans’ benefits statutes.  When it does so, the court has referred 
to Gardner’s Presumption more consistently, even if less frequently, than 
the Veterans Court.211  For example, in contrast to the Veterans Court, the 
Federal Circuit has cited Gardner’s Presumption regardless of whether the 
court adopted the VA’s or veteran’s interpretation.212  Yet, like the 
Veterans Court, the Federal Circuit has rarely analyzed the Presumption’s 
application to the facts of a given case.  Most commonly, the Federal 
Circuit simply refers to Gardner’s Presumption to support its assertion that 
veterans laws are veteran-friendly.213 
The Federal Circuit cited Gardner’s Presumption for the first time in 
                                                          
 210. The Federal Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions of the Veterans Court is limited 
by statute.  38 U.S.C. § 7292.  It has “exclusive jurisdiction to review and decide any 
challenge to the validity of any statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof brought 
under [section 7292], and to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions to the extent 
presented and necessary to a decision.”  38 U.S.C. § 7292(c).  It can review all relevant 
questions of law and set aside a regulation or an interpretation of a regulation that is 
arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; 
contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; in excess of statutory 
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or in violation of a statutory right; or without 
observance of procedure required by law.  38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1).  The court has no 
authority to review factual determinations or the application of a law or regulation to a 
particular set of facts unless a constitutional issue is presented.  38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). 
 211. See, e.g., Sursely v. Peake, 551 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (stating “in the 
face of statutory ambiguity, we must apply the rule that ‘interpretive doubt is to be resolved 
in the veteran’s favor’”) (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)); Principi, 
340 F.3d at 1383 (reaffirming Gardner’s Presumption when ambiguously worded statutes 
lead to interpretative doubt). 
 212. See, e.g., McNight v. Gober, 131 F.3d 1483 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (per curiam).  But see 
Bustos v. West, 179 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  In Bustos, the veteran sought review of the 
VA’s interpretation of the term “clear and unmistakable error,” as provided in both a statute 
and regulation.  Id. at 1380 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a)(1999) and 38 U.S.C. § 5109A).  The 
Federal Circuit agreed with the VA and neither cited nor mentioned Gardner’s Presumption.  
Id. at 1379–81.  In petitioning for certiorari, the attorney for the veteran expansively argued 
that “all veteran benefits statutes and regulations are to be construed in the veteran’s favor 
and any interpretation to the contrary is invalid.”  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Bustos 
v. West, 528 U.S. 967 (1999) (No. 99-443), 1999 WL 33640284, at *3.  Further, the 
attorney argued, wrongly, first, that neither King nor Gardner had required a threshold 
finding of ambiguity and, second, that both King and Gardner had held that reviewing 
courts must interpret statutes and regulations in veterans’ favor.  See id. at *4–5 (“Such a 
decision clearly misunderstands this Court’s holding [sic] in King and Gardner, which 
provide that a reviewing court must construe all veterans’ benefits laws in the veteran’s 
favor, regardless of any ambiguity.”) Neither assertion is correct:  both King and Gardner 
talked about interpretive doubt, or ambiguity, and both created the presumption in dictum.  
See supra Part II.B.  Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.  Bustos, 528 
U.S. 967. 
 213. See, e.g., Forshey v. Gober, 226 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000), rev’d sub nom, 
Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that pro-veteran legal 
presumptions reflect the compassionate intent of the veteran’s system). 
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1997, three years after Gardner was decided.  In McKnight v. Gober,214 a 
veteran claimed he had service-connected asthma.215  When the VA denied 
the claim, the veteran filed a claim to reopen but failed to provide “new and 
material evidence not previously considered.”216  For this reason, the VA 
denied the claim to reopen.217  On appeal, the veteran argued that the statute 
obligated the VA to notify veterans of the extent and quality of evidence 
necessary to prove a claim, whether the VA was aware of any such 
evidence or not.218  Both the Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit 
disagreed.219  The statute provided, in relevant part, “[i]f a claimant’s 
application for benefits . . . is incomplete, the Secretary shall notify the 
claimant of the evidence necessary to complete the application.”220  There 
was no relevant interpreting regulation; therefore, Chevron did not apply.221  
The Federal Circuit held that pursuant to the statute the VA need only 
notify the veteran of the evidence needed to complete an application when 
the VA knew of or should have known of the existence of any relevant 
evidence.222  In rejecting the veteran’s very broad interpretation, the court 
referred to Gardner’s Presumption:  “Certainly, if there is ambiguity in the 
statute, ‘interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor.’  
Nevertheless, the language of the provision does not suggest so broad an 
obligation.”223  From this statement, it is not entirely clear whether the 
court failed to find ambiguity, and thus found Gardner inapplicable, or 
whether the court found that even if ambiguity existed, the veteran’s 
interpretation did not comport with the statutory language.  In any event, in 
this case, the Federal Circuit referred to Gardner’s Presumption even 
though it ultimately adopted the VA’s interpretation.224  In contrast, the 
Veterans Court had failed to mention the Presumption when it held for the 
VA.225 
Just a year later, in Hodge v. West,226 the Federal Circuit again revisited 
the issue of what evidence was required to reopen a denied claim.  The VA 
had concluded that “new” evidence a veteran submitted in support of his 
                                                          
 214. 131 F.3d 1483 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (per curiam). 
 215. Id. at 1483. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 1484. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) (1994).   
 221. See infra Part V.D (discussing the inapplicability of Chevron when the litigation is 
between a veteran and the VA and there are no regulations interpreting the statute). 
 222. McKnight, 131 F.3d at 1485. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. See McKnight v. Brown, No. 96-0440 (Vet. App. March 27, 1997), aff’d sub nom. 
McKnight v. Gober, 131 F.3d 1483 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 226. 155 F.3d 1356 (1998). 
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claim for service-connected arthritis was not “material”; the Veterans Court 
agreed.227  The statute at issue provided that if “new and material evidence” 
surfaced in connection with a disallowed claim, the claim would be 
reopened for review.228  A VA regulation defined “new and material 
evidence” as: 
evidence not previously submitted to agency decision makers which 
bears directly and substantially upon the specific matter under 
consideration, which is neither cumulative nor redundant, and which by 
itself or in connection with evidence previously assembled is so 
significant that it must be considered in order to fairly decide the merits 
of the claim.229 
Despite the clarity of this regulation, the Veterans Court adopted and 
applied a different standard.230  The Veterans Court’s standard required that 
there be a reasonable possibility that the new evidence would change the 
outcome.231  The Federal Circuit reversed, rejecting the Veteran Court’s 
new standard.232  Unlike McKnight, Chevron applied in this case because 
there was an interpreting regulation.233  Applying Chevron’s second step, 
the Federal Circuit held that the Veterans Court should have deferred to the 
VA’s reasonable definition of the ambiguous statutory term “new and 
material evidence.”234  In addition, in a footnote, the Federal Circuit 
supported its holding by referring to Gardner’s Presumption. 
Our holding today is further supported by Brown v. Gardner . . . in 
which the Supreme Court restated the general rule that any interpretive 
doubt must be resolved in the veteran’s favor.  Indeed, because the 
regulation imposes a lower burden to reopen than the [Veterans Court’s] 
test, the Secretary’s construction is also the construction most favorable 
to the veteran.235 
Importantly, in this case, the Federal Circuit applied Gardner’s 
Presumption in a previously unapplied way:  the court used the 
Presumption as a tie-breaker between the VA’s interpretation and the 
Veterans Court’s interpretation.236  (The veteran had not offered an 
interpretation.)  Because the VA’s interpretation was more veteran-friendly 
than the Veteran Court’s interpretation and was reasonable under Chevron, 
                                                          
 227. Id. at 1358. 
 228. Id. at 1359 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 5108 (1995)). 
 229. Id. (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) (1994)(emphasis added)). 
 230. Id. at 1360. The Veterans Court borrowed from Social Security benefits law.  
 231. Id. at 1359–60. 
 232. Id. at 1360. 
 233. See infra Part V.D (noting that Chevron applies only where an agency implemented 
a regulation interpreting a statute). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 1361 n.1 (citations omitted). 
 236. Id. 
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the VA’s interpretation controlled.237  The Federal Circuit did not address 
the Chevron/Gardner conflict in this case because both pointed to the same 
interpretation.238   
The Federal Circuit again dodged the Chevron/Gardner conflict in Jones 
v. West.239  In that case, the court concluded that the statutory language at 
issue was clear and, thus, rejected the veteran’s interpretation.240  Because 
the language was clear, the court indicated in a footnote that neither 
Chevron nor Gardner applied because both required a threshold finding of 
ambiguity. 
[G]iven the plain meaning of the statutory provisions at issue, it is 
irrelevant for purposes of this appeal whether deference is warranted 
under Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, . . . .  For similar 
reasons, the mandate of Brown v. Gardner, . . . that “interpretive doubt is 
to be resolved in the veteran’s favor” has no bearing on the resolution of 
this case.241  
The court did not recognize that the two doctrines conflicted; rather, the 
court simply noted that ambiguity was a threshold finding for each 
doctrine.242  It would take the court two more years to acknowledge the 
conflict.243   
IV. JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE CHEVRON/GARDNER CONFLICT   
The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit’s more recent jurisprudence 
shows two courts struggling first to notice that Gardner’s Presumption and 
Chevron conflicted and, second, to resolve that conflict once they finally 
identified it.  Simply put, the Veterans Court has never adequately resolved 
the conflict, exploring the issue most commonly in cases in which Chevron 
did not apply.  In contrast, the Federal Circuit acknowledged the conflict 
earlier and attempted to resolve it in cases in which Chevron did apply.244  
Ultimately, both courts have concluded that Chevron trumps Gardner’s 
Presumption;245 however, neither court has explained why or whether 
Gardner’s Presumption retains any vitality in light of this conclusion.  The 
sections below explore the courts’ awakening to the conflict and their 
attempts to resolve it.  
                                                          
 237. Id. 
 238. Id.  
 239. 136 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 240. Id. at 1300. 
 241. Id. at 1299 n.2. 
 242. Id.; accord Terry v. Principi, 340 F.3d 1378, 1383 (2003) (recognizing that clarity 
of the statute precludes the need to apply Gardner’s Presumption). 
 243. The Federal Circuit first noticed the conflict in Boyer v. West, 210 F.3d 1351 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000).  See infra notes 325–330 and accompanying text.  
 244. See infra Part IV.B. 
 245. See infra Part IV.B. 
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A. The Veterans Court Explores the Conflict  
Until 2002, the Veterans Court seemed unaware of the conflict between 
Gardner’s Presumption and Chevron.  Then, in an unpublished opinion, the 
Veterans Court identified the conflict and tried to resolve it in Jordan v. 
Principi.246  In that case, a veteran suffered a knee injury in a motorcycle 
accident before entering the military.247  Yet, the veteran failed to disclose 
this injury upon entering service.248  When the injury flared up, the veteran 
was treated and discharged for “erroneous enlistment.”249  At discharge, the 
VA concluded that the injury was preexisting and was not aggravated by 
military service.250  Instead of challenging the decision when it was issued 
in 1983, the veteran waited almost fifteen years.251  When the veteran 
moved in 1998 to have the 1983 decision revised or reversed based upon 
clear and unmistakable error, the VA denied the motion.252 
On appeal before the Veterans Court, the parties argued about the proper 
interpretation of two statutes that both applied and yet conflicted.253  Trying 
to reconcile these statutes long before this case, the VA had issued two 
interpreting regulations.254  Because of the existence of the interpreting 
regulations, the court correctly noted that Chevron was the appropriate 
standard of review for determining whether the VA regulations were 
reasonable interpretations of the two conflicting statutes.255  Importantly, 
the court then noted for the first time the tension between Chevron and 
Gardner, calling them “competing principles of statutory construction.”256  
Applying Chevron’s second step, the court found the VA regulations to be 
reasonable interpretations of the two statutes.257  The court then rejected the 
veteran’s interpretation as “absurd.”258   
Placing limits on Gardner’s Presumption for the first time, the court 
noted that a veteran’s interpretation would not control when that 
interpretation was unreasonable:  “[W]e cannot blindly adopt a statutory 
interpretation simply because it would be beneficial to some claimants if 
that interpretation does not present a competing reasonable 
                                                          
 246. 16 Vet. App. 335 (2002), withdrawn, No. 00-206, 2002 WL 31445159 (Nov. 1, 
2002). 
 247. Id. at 336. 
 248. Id. at 337.  
 249. Id.  
 250. Id.  
 251. Id. at 337–38.  
 252. Id. at 338.  
 253. Id. at 343 (citing former 38 U.S.C. §§ 311, 353 (1979)). 
 254. Id. at 345 (citing 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.304(a) & 3.306(a) (1979)). 
 255. Id. at 346. 
 256. Id. at 345.  
 257. Id. at 348.  
 258. Id. at 347–48 (noting that the veteran’s interpretation “would have the Court read 
[one statute] in isolation from [the other statute] in certain cases”). 
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interpretation.”259  With this backdrop, the court tried to resolve the conflict 
between Chevron and Gardner’s Presumption by suggesting that 
Gardner’s Presumption should trump Chevron’s second step unless the 
veteran’s interpretation was unreasonable.260  The court’s resolution of the 
conflict—to apply Gardner’s Presumption when there are two reasonable 
interpretations of an ambiguous statute and to otherwise apply Chevron—
has superficial appeal.  Of course a court cannot adopt unreasonable and 
absurd interpretations of statutes; hence, Gardner’s Presumption must yield 
when the veteran proposes an unreasonable or absurd interpretation.261   
Yet, the resolution simply does not work.  Under Chevron, agencies have 
the authority to interpret ambiguous statutes.262  If Congress is clear, then 
Congress has interpreted the statute and, under Chevron’s first step, there is 
no room for agencies, courts, or even veterans to interpret that statute 
differently.263  Often, however, Congress is not clear.  When Congress is 
not clear, then agencies have the power, authority, and responsibility to 
choose from among reasonable, competing interpretations.264  Agencies 
have this power, not veterans.  Moreover, agencies theoretically can select 
only reasonable interpretations.265  An unreasonable interpretation would 
never be acceptable whether the agency or the litigant provided it.  
Resolving the conflict between Chevron and Gardner as the court 
attempted to do in this case would essentially remove the VA from the 
interpretive process.  According to the court’s proposed solution, either 
Congress was clear and Congress decided what the statute meant, or 
Congress was unclear and the veteran can decide what the statute means, so 
long as the veteran does not propose an unreasonable or absurd 
interpretation.  Under this proposed solution, the VA’s interpretation would 
control only when it is the single, reasonable interpretation of a statute.  
The court’s resolution falls short.266   
                                                          
 259. Id. at 348. 
 260. Id. 
[U]nder Brown v. Gardner, we must resolve interpretative doubt in favor of 
claimants only where there are competing reasonable interpretations of an 
ambiguous statutory provision and that, consequently, that interpretive doctrine 
cannot, by definition, be applied to lead to a statutory interpretation that produces 
an absurd result . . . because such and interpretation would be inherently not 
“reasonable.” 
Id.  
 261. See Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112, 128 (2004) (Ivers, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (noting, but not exploring, the conflict between the requirements of 
Chevron and Gardner). 
 262. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 865 
(1984). 
 263. Id. at 842–43.   
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 843–44. 
 266. Interestingly, the opinion was later withdrawn from the bound volume at the court’s 
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In 2004, the Veterans Court again explored and tried to resolve the 
conflict.  In Debeaord v. Principi,267 a veteran challenged the VA’s denial 
of his request for an increased disability rating for vision impairment.268  
The veteran had severe vision impairment in one eye that was service-
connected and less severe vision impairment in the other eye that was not 
service-connected.269  A statute allowed “a veteran [who] has suffered . . . 
blindness in one eye as a result of service-connected disability and 
blindness in the other eye as a result of non-service-connected disability” to 
recover benefits as if each injury were service-connected.270  The statute 
did not define “blindness.”271  Although the VA had a “‘confusing tapestry’ 
of regulations” defining blindness for other purposes,272 none of these 
regulations specifically defined “blindness” for the statute at issue.273  To 
resolve the statute’s meaning, the court turned to other definitions of 
“blindness” in related statutes.274  After doing so, the court rejected the 
veteran’s interpretation because the court believed that the veteran’s broad 
definition “would result in compensating a veteran for a non-service-
connected degree of impaired vision at a rate higher than if the same degree 
of vision impairment had resulted from service.”275  In other words, the 
court found the veteran’s interpretation to be absurd.  In this case, the 
veteran-litigant’s interpretation would benefit him, but it would harm other 
veterans.  Balancing these competing interests is the VA’s role.276   
                                                          
request after the parties moved jointly for full panel reconsideration due to newly discovered 
legislative and regulatory history.  Jordan v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 261, 265 (2003).  
Further, the parties jointly asked the court to invalidate one of the regulations at issue.  Id.  
The parties reargued the case; after rehearing, the court again rejected the veteran’s statutory 
interpretation claims because the VA was required to apply the regulation that existed at the 
time the events occurred, even though the regulation was subsequently changed.  Id. at 273–
74.  In the later opinion, the majority made no mention of the conflict.  However, by 
separate opinion, Judge Steinberg, who authored the first, withdrawn opinion, reiterated the 
distinction, namely that Gardner’s Presumption “is more aptly stated as prescribing that 
interpretative doubt must be resolved in favor of the claimant where there are competing 
reasonable interpretations of an ambiguous statutory provision.”  Id. at 280 (Steinberg, J., 
writing separately).  Nothing more was said. 
 267. 18 Vet. App. 357 (2004). 
 268. Id. at 359. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. at 363 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1160(a)(1) (2000)). 
 271. Id. at 363. 
 272. Id. at 366. 
 273. Id. at 367. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. at 366. 
 276. See generally DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VETERANS BENEFITS 
ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL BENEFITS REPORT FISCAL YEAR (2010), available at 
http://www.vba.va.gov/REPORTS/abr/2010_abr.pdf (“The mission of the Veterans Benefits 
Administration (VBA), in partnership with the Veterans Health Administration and the 
National Cemetery Administration, is to provide benefits and services to Veterans and their 
families in a responsive, timely, and compassionate manner in recognition of their service to 
the Nation.”). 
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Ultimately, the court did not specifically define “blindness.”277  Instead, 
the court concluded that the statute was not sufficiently ambiguous to 
require the court “to address the appellant’s argument that any ambiguity in 
[the statute] should be resolved in his favor . . . or to consider the 
application of the doctrine of Gardner . . . .”278  Additionally, the court 
noted that Chevron did not apply because there were no interpretive 
regulations.279  Despite concluding that neither Gardner’s Presumption nor 
Chevron applied, the court discussed the conflict anyway and muddled the 
analysis further, stating:   
If we had been required to deal with an ambiguous statutory scheme, 
however, it is not altogether clear that we would have to abandon the 
directive of the Supreme Court in Gardner, that “interpretive doubt is to 
be resolved in the veteran’s favor,” a directive derived from King v. St. 
Vincent’s Hospital, . . . a case issued seven years after Chevron, that 
applied that interpretive principle to “read [a regulation] in [the 
veteran’s] favor,” and that drew that principle from Fishgold v. Sullivan 
Drydock & Repair Corp., . . . a case decided long before Chevron . . . .  
Not only was that canon confirmed by the Supreme Court in Gardner ten 
years after Chevron, but it is one tailored specifically to veterans’ 
benefits statutes as contrasted with the more general statutory 
construction principle set forth in Chevron . . . .  In the last analysis, 
guidance from the Supreme Court would appear necessary to resolve this 
matter definitively.280 
The court’s analysis is incorrect in several ways.  First, Debeaord did not 
actually involve a conflict between Chevron and Gardner’s Presumption.  
Because there was no regulation interpreting the statute at issue, Chevron 
simply did not apply.281  Because there was no conflict, the court should 
not have addressed the issue; therefore, this language is dictum at best. 
Second, the Veterans Court found it relevant that the Supreme Court 
created Gardner’s Presumption in a case resolved before the Court decided 
Chevron—in Fishgold282—and then reaffirmed the existence of the 
Presumption in a case decided after the Court decided Chevron—in 
King.283  King’s reaffirmation of Fishgold, the court concluded, meant that 
Gardner’s Presumption should prevail over Chevron whenever there is 
                                                          
 277. Debeaord v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 357, 368 (2004). 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. (modification in original). 
 281. See supra Part II.C (explaining Chevron deference and its limits).  Whether the 
analysis from Skidmore v. Swift, Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) should have applied is another 
question, one beyond the scope of this article.  See generally Jellum, Chevron’s Step Zero, 
supra note 189 at 85–86 (2011) (exploring when Chevron deference rather than Skidmore 
deference is appropriate in the context of veteran’s jurisprudence). 
 282. 328 U.S. 275 (1946). 
 283. 502 U.S. 215 (1991). 
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conflict.284  Yet, this conclusion is based on an incomplete analysis of the 
underlying cases.  Neither King nor Fishgold involved agency 
interpretations of statutes; hence, Chevron would not have applied in either 
of those cases.  Whether Chevron was decided before or after those cases 
were decided is thus completely irrelevant to the resolution of the conflict 
between Chevron and Gardner.  It is possible that in cases in which a court 
interprets a statute without the aid of an agency interpretation, Gardner 
should apply and that in cases in which a court interprets a statute with the 
aid of an agency interpretation, Chevron should apply.285  Simply put, the 
timing of the cases, without more, tells us nothing because the Supreme 
Court did not address the issue. 
Finally, the Veterans Court finished its analysis in Debeaord by noting 
that specific statutory provisions control general statutory provisions when 
there is a conflict.286  This principle is indeed accurate.  Yet, the court 
implies that this principle resolves the conflict between Gardner’s 
Presumption and Chevron.  The court suggests that Gardner’s 
Presumption, a specific interpretive canon, should control over Chevron, a 
general interpretive canon, when there is conflict because of the specific-
general canon of interpretation.287  But this specific-general canon is an 
interpretive method for resolving conflicting statutes; it is not an 
interpretive method for resolving conflicting canons of interpretation and, 
to my knowledge, has never before been used as such.288  Further, it should 
not be used as such because the specific-general canon is based on 
legislative behavior rather than judicial behavior.289  The canon presumes 
that legislatures are aware of all existing statutes when they enact new 
statutes and that legislatures would expect a specific statute to apply over a 
conflicting, general one.290  Thus, the specific-general canon cannot resolve 
the conflict between Gardner’s Presumption and Chevron, and the court’s 
reliance on it was misplaced.  Perhaps the most persuasive point in the 
court’s analysis is its parting comment—that the Supreme Court should 
“resolve this matter definitively.”291   
Two years later, in 2006, the Veterans Court tried again to resolve the 
conflict, this time suggesting that Chevron should trump Gardner’s 
Presumption.  In Haas v. Nicholson,292 the court addressed whether a 
                                                          
 284. DeBeaord, 18 Vet. App. at 368 (2004). 
 285. See infra Parts V.C & V.D (discussing cases in which the court has come out on 
either side of this debate). 
 286. DeBeaord v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 357, 368 (2004). 
 287. Id. 
 288. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 59, at 140–44. 
 289. Id. at 141.   
 290. Id. 
 291. Debeaord, 18 Vet. App. at 368. 
 292. 20 Vet. App. 257 (2006), rev’d sub nom. Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 
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veteran who served on a ship that traveled near the coastal waters of 
Vietnam but who never went ashore “served in the Republic of 
Vietnam.”293  A statute presumed that any veteran who “served in the 
Republic of Vietnam” during specified time periods was exposed to Agent 
Orange.294  The VA promulgated a regulation interpreting this statutory 
phrase to apply only to those service members whose service involved 
“duty or visitation” in Vietnam.295  The VA then interpreted the phrase 
“duty or visitation” in its regulation to apply only to veterans who had 
physically set foot in Vietnam, even if only for a short time.296  Because 
Haas had served on a ship that was located near Vietnam but had never 
actually set foot in the country, the VA denied his claim for benefits.297   
Haas appealed, and the Veterans Court reversed.298  In its reasoning, the 
court looked first to the statute, acknowledging that it was ambiguous.299  
The court then turned to Chevron.300  Before applying Chevron, however, 
the court pointed out in a footnote that Gardner’s Presumption did not 
apply because Chevron did: 
It is noteworthy that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. 
Gardner . . . does not appear to apply in this instance.  In Terry v. 
Principi, the [Federal Circuit] observed that the principle enunciated in 
Brown is “a canon of statutory construction that requires that resolution 
of interpretive doubt arising from statutory language be resolved in favor 
of the veteran . . . .”  The Federal Circuit then concluded that the canon 
“does not affect the determination of whether an agency’s regulation is a 
permissible construction of a statute.”301 
The court said nothing more about Gardner and Chevron.  Instead, the 
court found the regulation ambiguous and turned to evaluate the VA’s 
interpretation of its regulation—that “duty or visitation” meant a veteran 
must have actually stepped onto the land.302  The court then rejected the 
VA’s interpretation of its own regulation.303  In doing so, the court 
                                                          
2008). 
 293. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. at 263 (quoting 38 U.S.C. 1116(f) (2000)). 
 294. Id.  
 295. Id. at 269 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii) (2006)). 
 296. Id. at 267. 
 297. Id. at 259. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. at 269.  Notably, Chevron is not the appropriate deference standard when an 
agency interprets its own regulation; Auer is.  JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 59, at 227.  Although it is possible that because the regulation 
merely parroted the statute, neither Chevron nor Auer applied pursuant to Gonzales v. 
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
 301. 20 Vet. App. at 269 n.4. 
 302. Id. at 269. 
 303. Id.  An agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is respected unless it is plainly 
wrong.  See Kerr, supra note 84.  It is hard to see how the VA’s interpretation of this 
regulation could have been plainly wrong.  The term “duty or visitation” is at least 
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substituted its own interpretation rather than determine that the VA’s 
interpretation was “plainly erroneous.”304  The case was reversed on appeal 
for this reason.305   
In 2007, in Sursely v. Peake,306 the Veterans Court again noted the 
conflict between Gardner’s Presumption and Chevron, but did not try to 
resolve the conflict.  In this case, the court affirmed a VA decision that 
refused a veteran’s request for two separate clothing allowances.307  The 
relevant statute authorized clothing allowances for disabled veterans who 
use a prosthetic or orthopedic appliance that tends to wear out or tear 
clothing.308  Because the veteran had two separate disabilities, he had 
requested two separate clothing allowances.309  The VA denied the second 
claim because the relevant statute used the singular:  “shall pay a clothing 
allowance of $662 per year . . . .”310  The Veterans Court affirmed the 
denial, finding the statutory language clear.311  The court did not initially 
mention Gardner’s Presumption because it found the statute 
unambiguous.312  However, the court later turned its attention to an 
interpreting regulation to determine whether Gardner’s Presumption 
applied.313  The court discussed, but did not resolve, the conflict between 
Chevron’s second step and Gardner’s Presumption:314  
The Federal Circuit has discussed the relationship between Brown and 
the second part of the Chevron analysis, cautioning that “a veteran 
‘cannot rely upon the generous spirit that suffuses the law generally to 
override the clear meaning of a particular provision,’” that “where the 
meaning of a statutory provision is ambiguous, [the Court] must take 
care not to invalidate otherwise reasonable agency regulations simply 
because they do not provide for a pro-claimant outcome in every 
imaginable case,” and that “[w]here a statute is ambiguous and the 
                                                          
ambiguous regarding whether a veteran had to step onto Vietnamese soil; indeed, requiring 
the veteran to actually step onto the land seems reasonable.  Because the VA’s interpretation 
was not plainly wrong, the Veterans Court should have upheld the regulation.  Instead, the 
court rejected this interpretation because it was “inconsistent” with precedent, was “plainly 
erroneous” pursuant to the legislative history, and was an “unreasonable” interpretation of 
the regulations.  Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. at 270. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 306. 22 Vet. App. 21 (2007), rev’d, 551 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 307. Id. at 27–28. 
 308. Id. at 23. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. (referring to 38 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006) (emphasis added)). 
 311. Id. at 22 (“The statutory language . . . clearly provides only one clothing allowance 
per eligible veteran . . . ”). 
 312. Id. at 26. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. at 26.  In so doing, the court referred to the Federal Circuit’s decisions in 
Disabled American Veterans v. Gober, 234 F.3d 682, 692 (Fed. Cir. 2000), Boyer v. West, 
210 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2000), and Sears v. Principi, 349 F.3d 1326, 1331–32 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003), discussed supra in Part IV.   
JELLUM.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/2/2011  5:18 PM 
96 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:59 
administering agency has issued a reasonable gap-filling or ambiguity-
resolving regulation, [the Court] must uphold that regulation.”315 
After describing the Federal Circuit’s concerns, the court found that the 
regulation and statute were clear and therefore, “[there was] no reason to 
apply [Gardner’s Presumption] in this instance.”316   
On appeal, the Federal Circuit disagreed and reversed.317  Finding that 
the regulation merely parroted the statute, the court refused to apply 
Chevron.318  Instead, the court found that the legislative history and 
Gardner’s Presumption were dispositive.319  Thus, in Sursely the Federal 
Circuit found Gardner’s Presumption (and the legislative history) to be 
dispositive,320 while the Veterans Court did not apply Gardner’s 
Presumption because the statute was clear.321  In short, the jurisprudence of 
the two courts was at odds. 
B. The Federal Circuit Explores the Conflict   
The Federal Circuit first noted the possible conflict in 2000,322 two years 
earlier than the Veterans Court.  The following year, the Federal Circuit 
suggested that Gardner’s Presumption did not apply in cases involving 
Chevron.323  At one time, the court suggested in dictum that Gardner’s 
Presumption was merely a canon of last resort when all other avenues for 
resolving ambiguity, including Chevron, fail.324  After struggling with the 
conflict for a number of years, in 2011 the court returned to its original 
position that Chevron trumped Gardner.  Gardner’s Presumption had 
fallen from grace. 
The first case in which the Federal Circuit addressed this issue of the 
interplay between Gardner’s Presumption and Chevron was Boyer v. 
West.325  In that case, the veteran raised the conflict by arguing that 
                                                          
 315. Sursely, 22 Vet. App. at 26 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 316. Id. at 27. 
 317. Sursely v. Peake, 551 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 318. Id. at 1355.  (“The regulation uses the word ‘the’ rather than the statute’s ‘a’ in 
reference to the term ‘clothing allowance.’ Changing articles from ‘a’ to ‘the’ does nothing 
to resolve the question at issue, and does not reflect a deliberate effort to interpret the 
statute’s meaning.”).  The court correctly refused to apply Chevron deference to an agency’s 
interpretation of a parroting regulation pursuant to the Supreme Court’s holding in Gonzales 
v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
 319. Sursely, 551 F.3d at 1357 (referencing both Congressional intent and Gardner in 
holding in the veteran’s favor).   
 320.  Id. 
 321.  Sursely v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 21, 22 (2007), rev’d, 551 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
 322.  Boyer v. West, 210 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  
 323. Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 
1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 324. Terri v. Principi, 340 F.3d 1378, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  
 325. 210 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  In this case, a veteran challenged the VA’s refusal 
to consider the hearing loss in his right ear when evaluating whether he had service-
JELLUM.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/2/2011  5:18 PM 
2011] RECONCILING BROWN V. GARDNER’S PRESUMPTION 97 
Gardner’s Presumption always trumped Chevron.326  However, the veteran 
was ill-advised to make this argument because Chevron was inapplicable; 
there was no regulation interpreting the statutory provision.327  Although 
Chevron did not apply, the Federal Circuit responded to the veteran’s 
argument anyway, stating that Gardner’s Presumption did not apply when 
the statute was clear.328  Here, the court concluded that the statute was clear 
and that the VA’s interpretation was consistent with the unambiguous 
language.329  The court then cautioned veterans not to “rely upon the 
generous spirit that suffuses the law generally to override the clear meaning 
of a particular provision.”330  Because Chevron did not apply and because 
the language of the statute was clear, the court had no reason to respond 
further to the veteran’s argument that Gardner’s Presumption always 
trumped Chevron.   
A short time later, however, the Federal Circuit addressed the conflict 
more directly.  In Disabled American Veterans v. Gober,331 the statute at 
issue allowed veterans to challenge existing VA decisions for “clear and 
unmistakable error.”332  The VA had issued regulations interpreting this 
language; thus, Chevron applied.333  Noting the conflict between Gardner’s 
Presumption and Chevron, the court cautioned litigants that while 
Gardner’s Presumption may alter the analysis, it does not trump 
Chevron.334  Thus, the court recognized that the two doctrines were in 
tension, but the court was unaware of, or at least did not articulate, the 
extent of this tension.  In any event, the court had no need to resolve the 
conflict because the issue on appeal involved a procedural challenge rather 
than an interpretive challenge.335  Thus, the court offered no further 
                                                          
connected hearing loss in his left ear.  Id. at 1352. 
 326. Id. at 1354. 
 327. Id. at 1354–55 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 4.85(f) (2000)).  Although the VA subsequently 
codified its interpretation.  Id.   
 328. See id. at 1355 (citations omitted) (recognizing that Gardner’s Presumption applies 
when a court finds ambiguity in a veterans’ benefits statute). 
 329. Id. at 1352. 
 330. Id. at 1355. 
 331. 234 F.3d 682 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 332. Id. at 695.  
 333. Id. at 686.  Several veterans groups challenged the regulations on procedural and 
interpretive grounds.  Id. 
 334. Id. at 692.  Specifically, the court said: 
Chevron deference applies if Congress is either silent or unclear on a particular 
issue. However, modifying the traditional Chevron analysis is the doctrine 
governing the interpretation of ambiguities in veterans’ benefit statutes—that 
“interpretative doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor.”  Yet, “[a]t the same 
time, we have also recognized that a veteran ‘cannot rely upon the generous spirit 
that suffuses the law generally to override the clear meaning of a particular 
provision.’” 
Id. at 691–92 (citations omitted). 
 335. Id. at 692.  The veteran argued that the VA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by 
failing to provide an adequate statement of the basis and purpose for the rules at issue and 
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guidance on how Gardner modified Chevron. 
One year later, in 2001, the Federal Circuit referred to the conflict yet 
again in dictum, this time suggesting that Gardner’s Presumption might be 
a part of Chevron’s first step.  In National Organization of Veterans’ 
Advocates, Inc. v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs,336 the statute at issue 
provided that specific benefits would be awarded to veterans “who 
[were] . . . entitled to receive . . . compensation at the time of death . . . .”337  
The court concluded that the phrase “entitled to receive” was ambiguous 
because the legislative history suggested one interpretation while 
Gardner’s Presumption suggested another.338  The court noted that “it is a 
well-established rule of statutory construction that when a statute is 
ambiguous, ‘interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor.’”339  
Chevron was not an issue in this case because the interpreting regulation 
was not issued through notice and comment procedures.340  Despite this 
fact, the court noted that if Chevron applied, the next step in the court’s 
analysis would be to apply Chevron because the traditional tools of 
statutory interpretation pointed in opposite directions.341  In saying that 
Chevron—meaning Chevron’s second step—would be the next step, the 
court suggested that Gardner’s Presumption should be part of Chevron’s 
first step.  In other words, the court seemed to be suggesting that if 
Gardner’s Presumption were to resolve any ambiguity at Chevron’s first 
step, then Chevron’s second step would be unnecessary.  Ultimately, the 
court remanded National Organization of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. on 
other grounds.342 
In 2003, the Federal Circuit addressed the conflict head on.343  In Sears 
                                                          
that the VA did not respond adequately to comments submitted during the rulemaking 
process. Id. 
 336. 260 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 337. Id. at 1377 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1318(b) (Supp. V 1999)). 
 338. Id. at 1377–78.  The court noted that the canons of interpretation for resolving that 
ambiguity pointed in different directions.  Specifically, the legislative history was relatively 
clear that the VA’s interpretation was correct.  Id. at 1377. 
 339. Id. at 1378 (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)).  Thus, although 
one of the traditional tools of interpretation (legislative history) directly supported the VA’s 
interpretative regulation, the Federal Circuit essentially ignored that history pursuant to 
Gardner’s Presumption simply because the interpretation was less favorable to the veteran.  
Id.    
 340. Id. at 1378 (stating imprecisely “[w]hile the parties do not argue the point, the 
Supreme Court has held that Chevron deference does not normally apply to informal 
rulemakings.”). 
 341. Id. at 1378–79.  
 342. Id. at 1380–81 (remanding for the VA to reconcile an inconsistency between the 
regulation at issue and another VA regulation). 
 343. In 2003, the Federal Circuit also briefly mentioned both doctrines in National 
Organization of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 330 F.3d 1345, 
1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  Note that this case has the same name as National Organization of 
Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
However, the cases are unrelated.  In the 2003 case, the court failed to acknowledge, let 
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v. Principi,344 the court soundly rejected the veteran’s argument that 
“ambiguity must always be resolved in favor of the veteran because the 
pro-claimant policy underlying the veterans’ benefits scheme overrides 
Chevron deference.”345  At issue was a VA regulation that established an 
effective date for a veteran’s post traumatic stress disorder claim.346  The 
statute provided that the effective date of such a claim “shall not be earlier 
than the date of receipt of application therefor.”347  The VA had issued a 
regulation interpreting this language such that the effective date for 
reopening a claim was the “[d]ate of receipt of new claim or date 
entitlement arose, whichever [was] later.”348  Thus, the VA interpreted the 
relevant statute to permit the earliest effective date of a reopened claim to 
be the date of the application for reopening rather than the date of the 
original denial; that interpretation in this case caused the veteran to lose 
five years’ worth of benefits.349   
On appeal, the veteran argued that the regulation was inconsistent with 
the statutory language and, alternatively, that the regulation was 
inconsistent with “the pro-claimant policy permeating Title 38.”350  The 
court applied Chevron, finding first that the statutory language was 
ambiguous and finding second that the VA’s interpretation was 
reasonable.351  Turning to the veteran’s alternative argument—that 
Gardner’s Presumption always trumps Chevron—the court said that 
“[e]ven where the meaning of a statutory provision is ambiguous, we must 
take care not to invalidate otherwise reasonable agency regulations simply 
because they do not provide for a pro-claimant outcome in every 
imaginable case.”352  Indeed, the court noted that neither it nor the veteran 
                                                          
alone resolve, any conflict.  Instead, the court said simply: 
The first inquiry under 5 U.S.C. § 706, in which we interpret the meaning of 
relevant statutes, is governed by the standards established by the Supreme Court in 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,  467 U.S. 837, 842–43 . . . .  
Thus, Chevron deference applies if Congress is either silent or ambiguous on a 
particular issue. However, when interpreting statutes relating to veterans, 
“interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor.”   
330 F.3d at 1349–50 (quoting 260 F.3d at 1378). 
Although the court identified both doctrines, the court did not acknowledge that the two 
conflicted.  Moreover, the court neither applied nor mentioned Chevron nor Gardner again 
in the remainder of the opinion.  Id. at 1350–52.  The court did note that the VA had argued 
that its regulation was entitled to Chevron deference, but the court itself did not apply the 
Chevron two-step analysis.  Id. at 1350.  Instead, the court said simply that the VA’s 
regulations were consistent with the statute and were, therefore, valid.  Id. at 1352.   
 344. 349 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 345. Id. at 1331. 
 346. Id. at 1329. 
 347. Id. at 1328 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a) (2000)). 
 348. Id. at 1328 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(q)(1)(ii) (2003)). 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. at 1330. 
 352. Id. at 1331–32. 
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could identify “a single case in which this court has invalidated a regulation 
that would otherwise be entitled to Chevron deference on this ground.”353  
Thus, in this case, Gardner’s Presumption lost to Chevron; however, the 
Federal Circuit did not explain specifically how to resolve the conflict.  
Rather, Gardner’s Presumption simply played no role in the court’s 
reasoning.  Perhaps the court believed that Gardner’s Presumption simply 
has no role in cases in which Chevron applies,354 but if so, the court could 
have stated so more clearly. 
Later that same year, the Federal Circuit clarified that Gardner’s 
Presumption did not apply in cases in which Chevron applied.  In Terry v. 
Principi,355 the veteran sought compensation for an eye condition that the 
VA had excluded from coverage.356  The relevant statute provided that only 
those disabilities attributable to an “injury” or a “disease” incurred or 
aggravated “in [the] line of duty” were compensable.357  The VA by 
regulation had excluded certain conditions, including “refractive error of 
the eye,” from the terms “injury” and “disease.”358  Thus, the VA denied 
the claim, and the veteran appealed.359  On appeal, the Federal Circuit 
applied Chevron, holding that the statute was ambiguous and the VA’s 
interpretation was a reasonable interpretation of that ambiguous 
language.360  The court then soundly rejected the veteran’s argument that 
“an otherwise reasonable interpretation of a statute by the VA is 
impermissible if the statute is not liberally construed in favor of the veteran 
[pursuant to Gardner’s Presumption].”361  Directly addressing the conflict, 
the court stated that Gardner’s Presumption “does not affect the 
determination of whether an agency’s regulation is a permissible 
construction of a statute.”362  In other words, Gardner’s Presumption 
simply does not apply when Chevron does.   
Seven years later, in 2010, the Federal Circuit contradicted itself when it 
again addressed the conflict in dictum.  This time the court suggested that 
Gardner’s Presumption might apply in a case involving Chevron, but that 
Gardner’s Presumption should be used only as a canon of last resort.  
Specifically, in Nielson v. Shinseki,363 the veteran lost almost all his teeth as 
                                                          
 353. Id. at 1332. 
 354. See infra Part V.E.  
 355. 340 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 356. Id. at 1380.  
 357. Id. at 1382 (quoting 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131 (2000)). 
 358. Id. at 1383 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c) (2003)). 
 359. Id. at 1381.  
 360. Id. at 1383–84. 
 361. Id. at 1384. 
 362. Id. (citing Nat’l Org. of Veterans’  Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 
F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 363. 607 F.3d 802 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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a result of a severe periodontal infection while in the service.364  The VA 
granted him service connection for the loss of teeth,365 but denied his 
request for dentures pursuant to a statute that provided veterans with 
“outpatient dental care and related dental appliances” for service-connected 
wounds or “‘other service trauma.’”366  The issue for the court was whether 
dental treatment could be considered a “service trauma.”367  The VA 
rejected this interpretation, stating that “‘service trauma’ does not include 
the intended result of proper medical treatment provided by the military.”368  
Because the VA had not interpreted this language by regulation, Chevron 
did not apply.369  Nonetheless, the court addressed the conflict between 
Chevron and Gardner’s Presumption because the veteran had argued that 
Gardner’s Presumption should be the first place for a court to turn in the 
face of statutory ambiguity.370  The Federal Circuit in dictum rejected this 
argument:  “The mere fact that the particular words of the statute—that is, 
“service trauma”—standing alone might be ambiguous does not compel us 
to resort to [Gardner’s Presumption].  Rather, that canon is only applicable 
after other interpretive guidelines have been exhausted, including 
Chevron.”371  In other words, Gardner’s Presumption applies only when a 
statute remains ambiguous after other common interpretive canons have 
been applied and other sources of meaning have been searched, including 
Chevron’s second step.372   
This approach is simply wrong.  If the dictum in Nielson were correct, 
then the only time Gardner’s Presumption would apply in a Chevron case 
                                                          
 364. Id. at 804. 
 365. Id. 
 366. Id. (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1712(a)(1)(C)). 
 367. Id. 
 368. Id. at 805. 
 369. See id. (applying a tool of statutory interpretation to give undefined words their 
ordinary meaning).  
 370. See id. at 808.  
 371. Id.  The court cited to a number of its prior precedents as support for its assertion.  
See id. at n.4     
 372. Similarly, the dissenting judges in Carpenter v. Principi used this last-resort 
approach.  15 Vet. App. 64, 88–89 (2001).  Whereas the majority viewed the presumption as 
a canon of first resort, the dissenting judges viewed the presumption as a canon of last 
resort.  Id.  Both dissenting judges proposed that before the court should resort to the 
presumption, other potential sources of meaning, such as legislative history, should be 
examined.  For example, Judge Steinberg argued that “it is incumbent on the Court to 
explore both the legislative history as well as the caselaw . . .” before rendering an 
interpretation.  Id. at 91 (Steinberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Similarly, 
Chief Judge Kramer complained that “the majority makes [its] holding, ostensibly based on 
the veterans benefits precept that any interpretive doubt as to the meaning of the statute . . . 
must be resolved in favor of the veteran, without discussing pertinent legislative history.”  
Id. at 94 (Kramer, C.J., dissenting).  Hence, the dissenting judges viewed Gardner’s 
Presumption as a canon to apply when the traditional tools of statutory interpretation fail to 
resolve ambiguity.  Only when other avenues of meaning fail should any remaining 
interpretive doubt be resolved in the veteran’s favor.   
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would be when the VA interpreted the statute in an unreasonable manner, 
because if the VA interpreted the statute in a reasonable manner, then no 
ambiguity would remain.  Admittedly, such an approach would greatly 
lessen the conflict between Chevron’s second step and Gardner’s 
Presumption for fewer statutes would be ambiguous if other avenues were 
first explored.  However, such an approach would eviscerate Gardner’s 
Presumption as it would be rare that the other tools of construction, 
especially Chevron’s second step, would not have resolved the ambiguity.  
Gardner’s Presumption, as originally formulated, furthers the important 
policies of rewarding veterans for their service and helping them return to 
civilian life; hence, eviscerating Gardner’s Presumption is not an ideal 
solution.  Moreover, with this dictum, the court ignored its earlier 
suggestion from both Terry and Sears that Gardner’s Presumption does not 
apply in cases involving Chevron.373 
In sum, the Federal Circuit has approached the Chevron/Gardner 
conflict somewhat inconsistently.  For this court, Gardner’s Presumption 
has morphed from a veteran’s ace in the hole, to a canon of last resort, to a 
doctrine effectively ignored.  In the court’s most recent case to address this 
issue, Guerra v. Shinseki,374 the majority returned to its position from Terry 
and Sears—that Chevron’s second step trumped Gardner’s Presumption.  
In Guerra, the majority made clear that Gardner’s Presumption yields to 
Chevron,375 while the dissent believed that Chevron yields to Gardner’s 
Presumption.376  So, which understanding is correct?  Should Gardner’s 
Presumption replace Chevron’s second step, become a canon of last resort 
applied only when the VA’s interpretation is unreasonable, or have no 
application in Chevron cases?  The next section offers various ways to 
resolve this conflict. 
V. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT   
This section identifies and explores ways to resolve the conflict between 
Gardner’s Presumption and Chevron.  In sum, Gardner’s Presumption 
must be returned to its original form:  a directive to liberally construe 
veterans’ benefits statutes.  In its current super-strong form, it should play 
no role in cases involving VA interpretations entitled to Chevron deference 
                                                          
 373. See Terry v. Principi, 340 F.3d 1378, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (choosing to apply 
Chevron rather than Gardner’s Presumption); Sears v. Principi, 349 F.3d 1326, 1331–32 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (applying the Chevron approach). 
 374. 642 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  The facts and reasoning of this case are detailed in 
infra Part V.C.3.  
 375. 642 F.3d at 1051 (rejecting the argument that Gardner’s Presumption overrides 
Chevron deference). 
 376. See id. at 1052–54 (Gajarsa, C.J., dissenting) (claiming that the majority should 
have turned to Gardner’s Presumption rather than Chevron’s second step after finding the 
statute ambiguous). 
JELLUM.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/2/2011  5:18 PM 
2011] RECONCILING BROWN V. GARDNER’S PRESUMPTION 103 
because these two interpretive canons are irreconcilable.377  In contrast, as a 
liberal construction canon, Gardner’s Presumption could be relevant at 
Chevron’s first step, as are other liberal construction canons.  However it is 
formulated, Gardner’s Presumption is never relevant during Chevron’s 
second step because at this point the VA’s reasonable interpretation is 
entitled to respect.  Additionally, in those cases in which the VA’s 
interpretation is not entitled to Chevron deference, Gardner’s Presumption 
might play a role as a valid tie-breaker—a presumption that rewards 
veterans for their sacrifice and helps them assimilate back into society.  
Finally, and most promisingly, Gardner’s Presumption might be viewed as 
a duty belonging to the VA rather than as an interpretive tool belonging to 
courts; however, only one court in one instance has explicitly applied this 
approach.  The next section explores these possible solutions. 
A. Gardner’s Presumption Should Re-morph 
Regardless of any other changes made to Gardner’s Presumption, courts 
should transform the Presumption back to the liberal construction canon of 
its youth.  A liberal construction canon is sufficiently veteran-friendly, 
without being overly veteran-friendly, to accommodate competing 
interests.  Moreover, such an approach would allow the VA to consider the 
best approach for veterans as a whole rather than allowing one particular 
veteran to highjack the interpretive process. 
When the Supreme Court first created and applied what I have called 
Gardner’s Presumption in Boone, the Court simply applied the familiar 
interpretive canon that remedial statutes should be construed liberally.378  
This formulation of Gardner’s Presumption (Boone’s interpretive canon) 
made sense:  when a statute was ambiguous, putting the veterans’ interests 
above private individuals’ interests and above governmental interests 
rewarded veterans for their service to this country and helped them 
assimilate back into society.379  Then, the Supreme Court in King 
transformed Boone’s interpretive canon from a simple directive to courts to 
construe veterans’ statutes liberally into a terse directive to courts to 
construe such statutes in favor of veterans.380  That change was neither 
explained nor necessary.  Notably, the Supreme Court developed 
Gardner’s Presumption into its super-strong formulation in King and then 
applied that formulation to cases involving VA interpretations in Gardner 
                                                          
 377. See Jellum, Chevron’s Step Zero, supra note 189 at 84–85 (2011) (explaining when 
Chevron rather than Skidmore deference is the appropriate standard for courts to use to 
review VA interpretations of statutes). 
 378. See Boone, 319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943) (construing the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil 
Relief Act liberally to favor those who have sacrificed to serve the nation).  
 379. See cases cited supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 380. King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 220–21 (1991). 
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shortly after VA decisions first became subject to judicial review.381  The 
Court may have transformed the Presumption as a way to encourage the 
VA to act in a veteran-friendly way or to encourage the new Veterans 
Court to err on the side of the veteran when interpreting veterans’ benefits 
statutes.  If accurate, the super-strong rendition of Gardner’s Presumption 
could be viewed as serving a transitional function—a function that should 
no longer be necessary now that judicial review of VA decisions is more 
than twenty-five years old.   
Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence shows that the Court strongly 
supports a liberal approach to interpreting veterans’ statutes generally.  
Illustratively, in Henderson the Court broadly interpreted a procedural 
statute.382  The statute at issue gave a veteran 120 days to appeal a VA 
decision to the Veterans Court.383  The veteran filed fifteen days late.384  
The Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit had both interpreted the statute 
strictly and dismissed the claim pursuant to an earlier Supreme Court case 
that held that such statutes were jurisdictional and thus, should be strictly 
construed.385  The Supreme Court reversed and said that this statute was not 
jurisdictional.386  In doing so, the Court stressed that the uniqueness of 
veterans law cautioned against strict interpretations in general.387  
Specifically, the Court mentioned that “Congress’ longstanding solicitude 
for veterans is plainly reflected in the [Veterans’ Judicial Review Act] and 
in subsequent laws that ‘place a thumb on the scale in the veteran’s favor in 
the course of administrative and judicial review of VA decisions . . . .’”388  
Additionally, the Court mentioned Gardner’s Presumption, noting that 
“[w]e have long applied ‘the canon that provisions for benefits to members 
of the Armed Services are to be construed in the beneficiaries’ favor.’”389  
With this language, the Court once again noted that veterans’ statutes 
should be broadly interpreted owing to the pro-claimant, veteran-friendly 
nature of veterans law.390  However, while the Supreme Court continues to 
quote Gardner’s Presumption in its super-strong formulation, the Court’s 
                                                          
 381. See Ridgway, supra note 20 (discussing the development of judicial review in the 
VA system). 
 382. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1198 (2011).  
 383. Id.  
 384. Id.  
 385. Id. (citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007)). 
 386. Id. at 1206.    
 387. See id. at 1199 (explaining differences between civil litigation and administrative 
litigation in veterans court). 
 388. Id. at 1199 (citations omitted). 
 389. Id. at 1206 (quoting King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 220–21 n.9 (1991)). 
 390. Id.  In another case, the Court mentioned that “Congress’ special solicitude for 
veterans might lead a reviewing court to consider harmful in a veteran’s case error that it 
might consider harmless in other cases . . . .” Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696, 1700 
(2009) (finding against the veteran). 
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rhetoric would also support the Presumption being returned to a liberal 
construction canon. 
Another reason to transform Gardner’s Presumption back into a liberal 
construction canon is that the current formation is difficult to apply.  For 
example, exactly how favorable to veterans must an interpretation be to 
survive analysis under Gardner’s Presumption?  The Federal Circuit raised 
this concern in Haas v. Peake.391  As noted earlier, the issue for the court in 
that case was whether a veteran who served on a ship that traveled near 
Vietnam but who never went ashore “served in the Republic of 
Vietnam.”392  The VA had promulgated a regulation interpreting this phrase 
to apply only to those veterans whose service involved “duty or visitation” 
in Vietnam.393  The VA then interpreted the phrase “duty or visitation” in 
the regulation to apply only to veterans who had physically set foot in 
Vietnam, even if only for a short time.394  The veteran had appealed the 
VA’s decision and lost.395   
Before the Federal Circuit in a petition for rehearing, the veteran argued 
that the Veterans Court should have applied Gardner’s Presumption.396  
The Federal Circuit disagreed.  In holding that the veteran had waived the 
argument that Gardner’s Presumption applied by not raising the issue in his 
original appeal, the court noted one difficulty of applying the Presumption:  
“this case would present a practical difficulty in determining what it means 
for an interpretation to be ‘pro-claimant.’”397  Specifically, the VA had 
already interpreted the statute in a pro-veteran manner by applying the 
language to any veteran who had set foot on land, for however long.398  
Haas wanted an even more pro-veteran interpretation, one that favored 
him.399   
Veteran-litigants are likely to suggest that an interpretation is sufficiently 
veteran-friendly only when it would allow them to win their cases.  Yet, 
such an answer potentially pits the veteran-litigant against all other 
veterans.  Whenever a veteran is in danger of losing benefits under the 
VA’s interpretation of a statute, that veteran will allege that the VA’s 
interpretation is not veteran-friendly enough.  Unless the veteran’s 
alternative interpretation is absurd, the courts’ current articulation of 
Gardner’s Presumption suggests that the veteran must win.400  If instead, 
                                                          
 391. 544 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 
 392. Id. at 1307–08. 
 393. Id. at 1308 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii)). 
 394. Id. at 1308–09. 
 395. Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168, 1168–69 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 396. Haas, 544 F.3d at 1308. 
 397. Id. at 1308–09. 
 398. Id. at 1309. 
 399. Id. at 1308.  
 400. See, e.g., Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1199 (2011) (describing the 
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Gardner’s Presumption simply required that veterans’ benefits statutes be 
liberally construed, then balance could be restored and veterans’ interests 
as a group could be considered.  Admittedly, a liberal-construction 
approach may raise similar concerns:  how liberal must the interpretation 
be to survive a challenge?  However, the change to a liberal construction 
canon would be an improvement because, as currently formulated, 
Gardner’s Presumption directs that only one interpretation is correct—the 
most veteran-friendly interpretation.  Whereas reformulated, Gardner’s 
Presumption would allow more than one interpretation to be acceptable.   
Veterans’ benefits statutes should be construed liberally, as all remedial 
statutes should.  Thus, Gardner’s Presumption should be returned to its 
humble beginnings when Boone’s interpretive canon directed courts to 
construe veterans’ benefits statutes liberally to protect those individuals 
who dropped their own affairs to fight for our nation.401  Gardner’s 
Presumption should re-morph to its original form. 
B. Gardner’s Presumption Should Only Apply to Veterans’ Benefits        
Statutes 
Regardless of whether the courts return Gardner’s Presumption to its 
liberal construction beginnings, Gardner’s application must be curtailed.  
Courts should apply Gardner’s Presumption only when the statute is truly a 
veterans’ benefits statute.  Gardner’s Presumption is simply inappropriate 
for resolving ambiguity in generally applicable statutes, because it makes 
no sense to allow veterans to interpret statutes that apply outside of the 
veterans’ arena.  Such a limit already applies in the context of Chevron:  
when an agency interprets a generally applicable statute, such as the tax 
code or the Administrative Procedures Act, Chevron does not apply.402   
This limitation has appeared in the Federal Circuit’s cases.  For example, 
the VA raised this issue during the appeal of Bazalo v. Brown.403  In that 
case, the VA interpreted the EAJA,404  a generally applicable statute that 
applies to litigants besides veterans.405  The issue in Bazalo was whether 
the veteran had to submit proof of his net worth within a thirty-day filing 
                                                          
current preference in favor of the veteran in review of VA decisions). 
 401. Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943).  Or, as Justice Douglas noted in a 
later case, “[b]ut as we indicated on another occasion, the Act must be read with an eye 
friendly to those who dropped their affairs to answer their country’s call.”  Le Maistre v. 
Leffers, 333 U.S. 1, 6 (1948). 
 402. See Jellum, Chevron’s Step Zero, supra note 189 at 84–85. 
 403. 9 Vet. App. 304 (1996), rev’d sub nom. Bazalo v. West, 150 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 
1998).  The EAJA allows parties, including veterans, to receive attorneys’ fees and expenses 
when they prevail in litigation against the government, so long as they meet certain 
requirements.  See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 404. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1991). 
 405. 9 Vet. App. at 308-09 (noting that the EAJA applies to the United States agencies 
and officials).  
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window.406  The Veterans Court held that the veteran could not supplement 
the defective application after thirty days.407  In its reasoning, the majority 
did not mention Gardner’s Presumption.408  
When the veteran appealed the case to the Federal Circuit, the VA 
argued, among other things, that Gardner’s Presumption did not apply 
because the EAJA was not a veterans’ benefits statute; rather, it was a 
generally applicable statute that applied to any party prevailing against the 
government.409  Hence, the VA argued that the Presumption should not 
apply.  The majority dodged the issue entirely stating that, “[i]n making 
this determination, we need not address whether the canon of construction 
that interpretive doubt be resolved in favor of a veteran should be 
applied.”410  In contrast to the majority, the dissent agreed with the VA:  
“[t]he EAJA is not a veterans’ benefits statute, however.  Rather, it is a 
statute of general applicability.  The rule of statutory construction upon 
which [the veteran] relies does not apply in this case.”411  The dissent’s 
approach is the correct one; Gardner’s Presumption should not apply to 
generally applicable statutes.   
In a more recent case, the Veterans Court applied this limitation.  In 
Ramsey v. Nicholson,412 the veteran sought mandamus to compel the VA to 
hear his case.  The VA Secretary had issued a memorandum staying a class 
of pending cases because the VA was appealing an adverse decision from 
the Veterans Court on the issue.413  The relevant statute directed the VA to 
decide cases “in regular order according to [their] place upon the 
docket.”414  The veteran argued that this language required the VA to 
process cases in strict numerical order without granting any stays.415  The 
court first rejected this narrow interpretation as absurd.416  The court then 
acknowledged that Gardner’s Presumption was relevant “where a veterans’ 
benefits statute is ambiguous.” 417  But the court was not convinced that 
“the statute in question [was] a veterans’ benefits statute rather than a 
                                                          
 406. Id. at 306.   
 407. Id. at 311. 
 408. In contrast, the dissent referred to Gardner’s Presumption.  Id. at 314–15 
(Steinberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the majority opinion 
“contradicts the Supreme Court’s recent charge that in construing a statute ‘interpretive 
doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor.’” (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 
118 (1994)). 
 409. Bazalo v. West, 150 F.3d. 1380, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 410. Id. at 1383–84 n.1. 
 411. Id. at 1384 (Schall, C.J., dissenting). 
 412. 20 Vet. App. 16 (2006). 
 413. Id. at 20. 
 414. Id. at 29 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 7107(a) (2006)). 
 415. Id. 
 416. See id. at 31 (describing the problematic scenarios that result from the veteran’s 
proposed literal interpretation of the statute). 
 417. Id. at 35. 
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statute setting general guidance for fairness . . . .”418  The court therefore 
concluded that Gardner’s Presumption did not apply. 
Most recently, in Henderson v. Shinseki,419 the Federal Circuit failed to 
mention Gardner’s Presumption in a case involving a statute that was not a 
veterans’ benefits statute.420  While the statute at issue identified the time 
for filing a notice of appeal with the Veterans Court and, thus, applied only 
to veterans’ cases, the statute did not provide any benefits to veterans.  The 
issue for the Federal Circuit was whether the statute was subject to 
equitable tolling.421  The court held that the statute could not be tolled but 
never mentioned Gardner’s Presumption.422  Why the court failed to 
mention Gardner’s Presumption is unclear, but it is possible that the court 
ignored the Presumption because the statute at issue was not a veterans’ 
benefits statute.  Notably, Chevron did not apply.   
Candidly, the Supreme Court has ignored the distinction between a 
veterans’ benefits statute and a veterans’ statute.  The Court reversed the 
Federal Circuit’s holding in Henderson and cited Gardner’s Presumption to 
support its pro-veteran decision.423  The Court’s opinion suggests that it 
applies Gardner’s Presumption to all veterans’ statutes regardless of 
whether they are veterans’ benefits statutes.  Perhaps the Court should 
reconsider this conclusion, but at a minimum, Gardner’s Presumption 
should not apply to generally applicable statutes like the EAJA.   
Hence, even if Gardner’s Presumption is an appropriate canon for judges 
to use when interpreting statutes, courts should not use the Presumption 
when the statute at issue is not a veterans’ statute, such as one meant to 
provide review of VA decisions.  The Presumption is also inappropriate 
when the statute is not a veterans benefit statute meant to thank and honor 
veterans for their service.  Certainly, veterans should play no role in 
interpreting generally applicable statutes. 
                                                          
 418. Id. 
 419. 589 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011). 
 420. Id.  
 421. Id. at 1203. 
 422. See id. at 1220.  The majority did not mention Gardner’s Presumption, but the 
dissent did.  Without addressing the issue of whether a statute that sets an appeal deadline is 
a veterans’ benefits statute, the dissent chastised the majority for ignoring Gardner’s 
Presumption: 
This court often pays lip-service to “the canon that provisions for benefits to 
members of the Armed Services are to be construed in the beneficiaries’ favor.” . . . 
In reality, however, it not infrequently fails in its “fundamental obligation to apply 
the law, when the issue is an open one, in favor of the veteran.” Even if this were a 
close case, which it is not, we would be obliged to resolve any interpretive doubt 
regarding whether equitable tolling applies to section 7266 in the veteran’s favor.   
Id. at 1232 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 423. See Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1206 (2011) (stating that the VA is 
required to give veterans the benefit of any doubt when reviewing evidence regarding the 
veteran’s claim). 
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C. Gardner’s Presumption When Chevron Applies  
Gardner’s application should be curtailed in another way as well.  
Gardner’s Presumption, as currently formulated, should not apply when 
Chevron applies because Chevron’s second step and Gardner’s 
Presumption directly collide.  Alternatively, if Gardner’s Presumption 
were to re-morph into a liberal construction canon, then it should apply at 
Chevron’s first step, as all liberal construction canons do, rather than at 
Chevron’s second step.  Indeed, regardless of which form it takes, 
Gardner’s Presumption is simply inapplicable during Chevron’s second 
step.  This section addresses the conflict between Chevron and Gardner’s 
Presumption. 
1. No application 
In its super-strong formulation, Gardner’s Presumption should play no 
role in cases involving VA interpretations entitled to Chevron deference for 
two reasons.  First, this resolution is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence related to both Gardner’s Presumption and Chevron.  
Second, Gardner’s Presumption invites courts to let their view of what is 
most beneficial to veterans trump the view of the expert agency, the VA. 
First, a resolution precluding the Presumption from applying in cases 
that involve VA interpretations entitled to Chevron deference is consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence related to Gardner’s Presumption.  
Importantly, neither Boone, Fishgold, nor King involved an agency 
interpretation, and therefore, Chevron was not an issue in those cases.424  
Moreover, the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the conflict.  
While Gardner did involve an agency interpretation, the Court never 
reached Chevron’s second step because the statute was clear.425  Rather, the 
Court simply noted that the interpreting regulation was inconsistent with 
the plain language of the statute—a holding consistent with Chevron’s first 
step—and stopped its analysis.426  Admittedly, the Court indirectly 
addressed Chevron’s second step in a footnote.427  In that footnote, the 
Court indicated that even if the statutory language were ambiguous, a 
finding consistent with Chevron’s second step, any “interpretive doubt 
[would] be resolved in the veteran’s favor.”428  Yet, the dictum contained in 
                                                          
 424. King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215 (1991); Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & 
Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275 (1946); Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561 (1943).     
 425. As noted earlier, the first time the Court cites Chevron is toward the end of the 
opinion, when the Court quotes another case, Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 
402, 409 (1993), which quotes Chevron.  Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 120 (1994). Only 
in the very last paragraph does the Court cite Chevron for justification for the Court’s 
refusal to defer.  Id. at 122. 
 426. Id. at 118–19. 
 427. Id. at 118 n.2. 
 428. Id.  
JELLUM.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/2/2011  5:18 PM 
110 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:59 
this footnote does not show either that the Court clearly understood the 
conflict between Gardner’s Presumption and Chevron’s second step or that 
the Court actually resolved that conflict.  Rather, the footnote appears to be 
more of an afterthought, added as additional support for the Court’s 
primary reasoning.  Simply put, the Supreme Court to date has not directly 
addressed the question of whether Gardner’s Presumption should apply in 
the face of a reasonable, but contradictory, agency interpretation.   
Second, if the Supreme Court were to actually address the issue, it 
should conclude that Gardner’s Presumption has no role in cases involving 
VA interpretations entitled to Chevron deference.  According to Chevron, 
agencies have the power to interpret ambiguous statutes because of their 
expertise, because of Congress’s implied delegation to them, and because 
they are politically accountable.429  Applying Chevron’s delegation 
rationale to veterans law, the Court should note that Congress gives power 
to the VA to fill the interstices of the law; such power is given neither to 
veterans, nor to the courts.430  If Gardner’s Presumption applied to cases in 
which Chevron also applied, then Chevron would no longer be about the 
reasonableness of the VA’s interpretation.  Rather, under the current 
version of Gardner’s Presumption, Chevron would become a question of 
which interpretation—the VA’s or the veteran’s—that the court thought 
was more favorable to the veteran.  Because the veteran’s interpretation 
will almost always be the most veteran-friendly, the power to fill interstices 
in the law would belong to veterans and the courts rather than to the 
experienced VA.  
Notably, there would be less conflict if Gardner’s Presumption returned 
to its original formulation, although the conflict would not disappear 
completely.  If courts were directed to broadly interpret ambiguous 
veterans’ benefits statutes at some point in the Chevron analysis, the 
veteran’s interpretive role would lessen but not disappear.  In this scenario, 
the courts’ role would be greater than currently envisioned under Chevron, 
for courts would have to determine which of two interpretations—the VA’s 
or the veteran’s—was the better interpretation.  While this result is an 
improvement because the balance of interpretive power would not be in 
each veteran-litigant’s hands, it is not ideal because the court would retain 
the balance of interpretive power.  If Gardner’s Presumption plays a role 
when Chevron applies, it seems unlikely that a court would adopt the VA’s 
reasonable interpretation. 
Perhaps for this reason, the Federal Circuit cautioned that courts “must 
take care not to invalidate otherwise reasonable agency regulations simply 
                                                          
 429. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44, 865–
66 (1984). 
 430. Id. at 865. 
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because they do not provide for a pro-claimant outcome in every 
imaginable case.”431  In Sears, the Federal Circuit soundly rejected a 
veteran’s argument that “ambiguity must always be resolved in favor of the 
veteran because the pro-claimant policy underlying the veterans’ benefits 
scheme overrides Chevron deference.”432  Similarly, in Terry, the Federal 
Circuit recognized Gardner’s Presumption as “a canon of statutory 
construction,” but noted that it does not affect whether a regulation meets 
the requirements of Chevron.433  In other words, courts should ignore 
Gardner’s Presumption when Chevron applies.   
2. Chevron’s first step  
Alternatively, assuming the statute in controversy is a veterans’ benefits 
statute and that Chevron applies, then Gardner’s Presumption as re-
morphed might be part of Chevron’s first step—determining whether 
Congress has directly spoken to the issue—not a trump to Chevron’s 
second step.  If courts were to apply Gardner’s Presumption as currently 
formulated at Chevron’s first step, then courts might let their own view of 
what most helps a particular veteran trump the VA’s view, which aims to 
benefit veterans as a group.  But in its original form, Gardner’s 
Presumption was nothing more than a liberal construction canon in the 
context of a particular area of law.434  Because veterans’ benefits statutes 
are remedial,435 courts applying Chevron’s first step could presume that 
Congress intended a liberal construction.  Assuming that Congress prefers 
courts to interpret veterans’ benefits statutes liberally, then applying this 
liberal construction canon during the analysis of Chevron’s first step makes 
sense.  And assuming that the first step of Chevron requires a full statutory 
analysis with all “the traditional tools of statutory construction,”436 then 
applying this liberal construction canon during the analysis of Chevron’s 
first step is consistent with courts’ use of other remedial canons.  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court and lower courts have applied remedial canons in this 
way in the past.437  Thus, Gardner’s Presumption would no longer be an 
                                                          
 431. Sears v. Principi, 349 F.3d 1326, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  
 432. Id. at 1331.  Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit did not explain how to resolve the 
tension between Gardner’s Presumption and Chevron’s second step. 
 433. Terry v. Principi, 340 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Nat’l Org. of 
Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 
2001)). 
 434. See supra Part II.A (explaining the development of Gardner’s Presumption as 
liberally construed). 
 435. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
 436. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 
(1984).  But see, Chevron’s Demise, supra note 95, at 729 n.25 (arguing that Justice Scalia 
has successfully transformed Chevron’s first step from a full statutory construction inquiry 
into a textual inquire only). 
 437. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 n.45 (2001) (applying presumption 
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ace in the hole for veterans, but the concepts behind the Presumption and 
veterans law in general—which are pro-claimant and veteran-friendly—
would still be furthered.  Moreover, agency expertise would be retained.   
While no court has directly applied this approach, the Federal Circuit 
came the closest in National Organization of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. 
Secretary of Veterans Affairs.438  In that case, the court hinted that 
Gardner’s Presumption, in its present super-strong formation, should be 
part of Chevron’s first step.  The court found the statute in that case to be 
ambiguous because the legislative history suggested one interpretation 
while Gardner’s Presumption suggested another.439  Thus, although one of 
the traditional tools of interpretation, legislative history, directly supported 
the VA’s interpretation, the Federal Circuit gave less weight to that history 
because of Gardner’s Presumption.440   
Importantly, Chevron was not an issue in that case because the 
interpreting regulation was not issued through notice and comment 
procedures.441  Yet, the court noted that if Chevron applied, the next step in 
the court’s analysis would be to apply Chevron’s second step because the 
traditional tools of statutory interpretation pointed in opposite directions.442  
In saying that Chevron would be the next step, the court implied that 
Gardner’s Presumption should be part of Chevron’s first step.  The court’s 
approach is sound except for one point:  if a court applies Gardner’s 
Presumption in its super-strong formulation at step one, then it is unlikely 
that the court would ever reach step two because the court would 
overwhelmingly find in favor of the veteran.  If instead a court applies 
Gardner’s Presumption in its liberal-construction formulation at step one, 
then it is very possible that the court would still find a statute ambiguous 
despite applying the Presumption. 
3. Chevron’s second step 
While Gardner’s Presumption as re-morphed may be relevant to the 
inquiry under Chevron’s first step, it is never relevant at Chevron’s second 
step.  When Chevron’s second step applies, courts should adopt any 
                                                          
against retroactivity during Chevron’s first step); see also Kenneth Bamberger, Normative 
Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L. J. 64, 77–78 (2008) 
(suggesting that a majority of courts apply such canons to eliminate statutory ambiguity at 
Chevron’s first step). 
 438. 260 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 439. Id. at 1377–78.  The court noted that the canons of interpretation for resolving that 
ambiguity pointed in different directions.  Specifically, the legislative history was relatively 
clear that the VA’s interpretation was correct.  Id. at 1377. 
 440. Id. at 1378 (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)).   
 441. Id. (“While the parties do not argue the point, the Supreme Court has held that 
Chevron deference does not normally apply to informal rulemakings.”). 
 442. Id. 
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reasonable VA interpretation.  In so doing, courts should presume that the 
VA—the expert agency charged with helping veterans—adopted the 
interpretation that is most helpful to veterans as a whole even if the 
veteran-litigant loses.  Courts do not have the requisite expertise to identify 
that interpretation; that was one lesson from Chevron.443  If courts apply 
Gardner’s Presumption in every case in which they find statutes 
ambiguous after applying step one of Chevron, then the veteran-litigant’s 
interpretation will always control, unless it is absurd.  Thus, each individual 
veteran would have the power to hijack the interpretive process from the 
VA.   
A resolution to adopt any reasonable interpretation of the VA when 
applying Chevron’s second step is consistent with the later jurisprudence of 
both the Federal Circuit444 and the Veterans Court.445  Both of these courts 
ultimately concluded that when a court reaches Chevron’s second step, 
Gardner’s Presumption does not apply.  For example, in the Federal 
Circuit’s most recent case to address this issue, Guerra v. Shinseki,446 the 
majority made clear that Chevron’s second step trumped Gardner’s 
Presumption.447  In Guerra, the issue on appeal was whether the VA 
correctly interpreted a statute that provided for additional monthly 
compensation to severely-disabled veterans.448  The statute provided 
significant additional compensation to veterans who had a particular 
disability rated at 100% (a “total disability”) if that veteran also had 
“another independently rated disability or combination of disabilities rated 
at 60%, or was permanently housebound by reason of service-connected 
disability.”449  The veteran in the case had multiple service-connected 
                                                          
 443. In Chevron, the Court noted the importance of agency expertise, reasoning that 
“judges are not experts,” at least not in these technical areas.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.  In 
contrast, agency personnel are highly qualified to make technical determinations and are 
charged with making such determinations.  Id.  Thus, it simply makes sense to defer to such 
expertise.  Id.  This justification was not new.  Two earlier cases had also referred to this 
rationale.  See NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns., Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130–31 (1944) (commenting 
that administrators had the benefit of “[e]veryday experience in the administration of the 
statute” which “gives it familiarity with the circumstances and backgrounds of employment 
relationships”); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137–38 (1944) (opining that the 
agency administrator had “accumulated a considerable experience in the problems” that the 
agency faced).  
 444. E.g., Sears v. Principi, 349 F.3d 1326, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (cautioning that 
courts “must take care not to invalidate otherwise reasonable agency regulations simply 
because they do not provide for a pro-claimant outcome in every imaginable case.”); accord 
Terry v. Principi, 340 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, 
Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 445. See generally Haas v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 257, 269 n.4 (2006), rev’d sub nom. 
Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 446. 642 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 447. Id. at 1049. 
 448. Id. at 1047. 
 449. Id. at 1050. The statute provides that a veteran shall receive special monthly 
compensation:  “If the veteran has a service-connected disability rated as total, and (1) has 
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disabilities that when combined exceeded a rating of 100%, but none of 
those disabilities individually rated at 100%.450  The veteran argued that 
additional compensation should be available to any veteran who was totally 
disabled, regardless of whether the veteran had a single disability rated at 
100% or had multiple disability ratings that combined to 100%.451  The 
Veterans Court disagreed, and pursuant to Chevron’s first step, found the 
text of the statute clear:  the veteran did not meet the threshold requirement 
for special monthly compensation of “a service-connected disability rated 
as total” because none of his disabilities independently rated as 100%.452   
A majority of the Federal Circuit agreed, looking to the statute’s use of 
the singular “a” before “service-connected disability.”453  However, the 
majority acknowledged that the statute “[was] not entirely free from 
ambiguity,” so the court felt “compelled” to defer to the VA’s 
interpretation pursuant to Chevron’s second step.454  Because the VA had 
promulgated a regulation interpreting the statute to require “a single 
service-connected disability rated as 100 percent,” the veteran’s 
interpretation failed.455  The majority noted that it had previously rejected 
“the argument that the pro-veteran canon of construction [Gardner’s 
Presumption] overrides the deference due to the VA’s reasonable 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute.”456  Thus, the majority found the 
statute ambiguous and adopted the VA’s reasonable interpretation pursuant 
to Chevron; consequently, Gardner’s Presumption was simply 
inapplicable.457 
In contrast, the dissent found Chevron inapplicable and asserted that the 
majority should have turned to Gardner’s Presumption rather than to 
Chevron’s second step once it had found ambiguity.  Pursuant to this 
approach, veterans would always resolve any interpretive doubt or 
ambiguity in a veterans’ benefits statute.  Yet, the dissent’s approach is 
surely wrong.  When courts turn to Chevron’s second step to interpret 
ambiguous statutes, Gardner’s Presumption should be irrelevant.  When 
the VA has reasonably interpreted statutes using force of law procedures, 
the interpretations are entitled to Chevron deference because the VA has 
the power to interpret ambiguous statutes, not veterans.   
                                                          
additional service-connected disability or disabilities independently ratable at 60 percent or 
more, or, (2) by reason of such veteran’s service-connected disability or disabilities, is 
permanently housebound.”  38 U.S.C. 1114(s) (2006). 
 450. Guerra, 642 F.3d at 1048.   
 451. Id. at 1048. 
 452. Id. (referencing 38 U.S.C. 1114(s) (2006)).   
 453. Id. at 1049. 
 454. Id. 
 455. Id. (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(i) (2009) (emphasis added)). 
 456. Id. at 1051 (citing Sears v. Principi, 349 F.3d 1326, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 457. Id. at 1049. 
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D. Gardner’s Presumption When Chevron Does Not Apply 
If the statute in controversy is a veterans’ benefits statute and if Chevron 
does not apply, then Gardner’s Presumption, preferably as re-morphed, 
should apply.  Gardner’s Presumption applies in those cases in which the 
VA either has not acted or has not acted in a way that would entitle it to 
Chevron deference.  In the context of VA interpretations, Chevron 
deference is inapplicable in three situations:  (1) when the litigation 
involves private parties and there is no relevant VA regulation; (2) when 
the VA has not interpreted the statute prior to the litigation; and (3) when 
the VA is not entitled to Chevron deference for its interpretation of a 
statute.458   
First, for those cases involving private litigants, such as an employer and 
the veteran, Gardner’s Presumption is a fair tiebreaker, assuming the VA 
has not promulgated a regulation or acted via formal adjudication to 
interpret the statute.  The purpose of veterans’ statutes in general is to thank 
veterans for their service and help them assimilate back into society;459 
hence, interpreting a veterans’ statute to benefit veterans rather than 
employers, other private litigants, or governments, makes sense as a 
statutory interpretation approach.  Such an approach is also consistent with 
the remedial construction canon.  For example, if Congress had to choose 
between inconveniencing employers by requiring them to keep the jobs of 
service personnel available or inconveniencing veterans who had to leave a 
job to fight a war, Congress likely would choose to protect veterans’ job 
security.  These are, perhaps, the easy cases. 
Second, however, when the litigation is not between the veteran and a 
private or government party, but rather between the veteran and the VA; 
then, the answer is less simple.  When the VA has not interpreted a statute 
prior to the litigation, then Gardner’s Presumption may be a fair tiebreaker.  
For example, in Robinette v. Brown,460 the Veterans Court reviewed a VA 
decision denying a veteran entitlement to service-connected benefits for 
diabetes.461  The veteran’s service records had been destroyed in a fire.462  
To establish that his military service caused his diabetes, the veteran 
offered his written recollection of what his physician had told him.463  The 
issue for the court was whether the VA was obligated to advise the veteran 
as to what evidence was necessary for his application to be complete.464  
The relevant statute provided that “[i]f a claimant’s application for benefits 
                                                          
 458. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 459. See supra Part II.B. 
 460. 8 Vet. App. 69 (1995). 
 461. Id. at 71. 
 462. Id. 
 463. Id. at 71, 73. 
 464. Id. at 77. 
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under the laws administered by the Secretary is incomplete, the Secretary 
shall notify the claimant of the evidence necessary to complete the 
application.”465  The VA argued that it need only help veterans complete 
the claim form, not help them identify necessary evidence.466  The court 
rejected this argument as contrary to the plain meaning of the text.467  In so 
doing, the court referred to Gardner’s Presumption and rejected the VA’s 
“quite narrow” interpretation.468  In this case, the VA had not, prior to the 
litigation, interpreted the statute in a way that deserved Chevron 
deference.469  Rather, the VA had interpreted the statute during the 
litigation or during the events leading up to the litigation.470  In this 
situation, the court’s decision to turn to Gardner’s Presumption makes 
sense because there was no carefully considered agency interpretation 
entitled to deference.  Rather, the VA offered its position for the first time 
in response to litigation without using force of law procedures.  The 
deliberateness and carefulness of the VA’s interpretation might be suspect 
if developed informally in response to pending litigation; hence, it should 
not receive strong deference. 
Third, even when the VA interprets a statute prior to the ensuing 
litigation but does so without using force of law procedures, then 
Gardner’s Presumption may be a fair tiebreaker.471  Agencies interpret 
statutes regularly and in varied ways, with more or less procedural 
formality and deliberation.  For example, an agency might interpret a 
statute as part of a notice and comment rulemaking process, like the 
Environmental Protection Agency did in Chevron.472  Similarly, an agency 
might interpret a statute during a formal adjudication.  In contrast, an 
agency might interpret a statute when drafting an internal policy manual or 
when writing a letter to a regulated entity.473  With the first two processes, 
Congress gave the agency the authority to issue interpretations that carry 
“force of law,” and the agency used that authority to issue the particular 
                                                          
 465. Id. (quoting 38 U.S.C. 5103(a) (1994) (emphasis added)). 
 466. Id. 
 467. Id. at 78. 
 468. Id. at 77. 
 469. Id. 
 470. See id. at 78–79 (describing the Secretary’s interpretation of the statute in the 
context of litigation). 
 471. For a detailed discussion of when Skidmore deference is appropriate and when 
Chevron deference is appropriate, see Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 
187, 207 (2006) (exploring the disagreement between Justices Scalia and Breyer regarding 
Chevron’s first step); Lisa Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency 
Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1486 (2005) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
in this area); Jellum supra note 281, at 86–98. 
 472. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984). 
 473. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (interpreting a statute in 
a bulletin); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (interpreting a statute in 
response to a letter inquiry from the county).  
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interpretation.474  For this reason, these processes are considered more 
formal, or procedurally prescribed, while the latter processes are less 
formal, or less procedurally prescribed.475  According to three Supreme 
Court cases decided a decade ago, Chevron deference is appropriate (1) 
when Congress delegates relatively formal procedures that the agency uses, 
or (2) when Congress provides other evidence that it intended courts to 
defer to the agency interpretation.476  In all other situations, a different level 
of deference applies:  Skidmore deference.477  According to Skidmore 
deference, courts should consider whether the agency’s interpretation was 
persuasive, taking into account “all those factors which give [the agency 
interpretation] power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”478  This 
“power-to-persuade” test involves a balancing of three factors:  (1) the 
consistency of the agency’s interpretation; (2) the thoroughness of the 
agency’s consideration; and, (3) the soundness of the agency’s reasoning.479  
A court could consider Gardner’s Presumption as one part of its analysis 
regarding whether the VA’s reasoning was persuasive under Skidmore 
analysis.   
The Veterans Court adopted a similar, although less clearly stated, 
approach in Osman v. Peake.480  In that case, the court noted that Skidmore 
deference was the appropriate standard for reviewing a VA General 
Counsel opinion that interpreted a statute.481  The issue in Osman was 
whether the son of two permanently-disabled veterans was entitled to one 
dependent educational benefit or whether he was entitled to two separate 
awards based on each parent’s disability.482  The text of the relevant statute 
provided that “[e]ach eligible person shall . . . be entitled to receive 
educational assistance.”483  “Person” in the statute was defined as a “child 
of a person who, as a result of qualifying service . . . has a total disability 
permanent in nature resulting from a service-connected disability.”484  The 
VA General Counsel had, prior to the case, issued a “precedent opinion” 
                                                          
 474. Mead, 533 U.S. at 231–33. 
 475. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 471, at 1447 (questioning “whether Chevron 
deference applies to interpretations issued through informal procedures”). 
 476. As some have noted: 
[After] Christensen, Mead, and Barnhart, the real question is Congress’s (implied) 
instructions in the particular statutory scheme.  The grant of authority to act with 
the force of law is a sufficient but not necessary condition for a court to find that 
Congress has granted an agency the power to interpret ambiguous statutory terms. 
Sunstein, supra note 471, at 218. 
 477. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 478. Id. at 140. 
 479. Id. 
 480. 22 Vet. App. 252 (2008). 
 481. Id. at 256. 
 482. Id. at 253. 
 483. Id. at 255 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 3510 (2006)). 
 484. Id. (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 3501 (a)(1)(A)(i-ii) (2006)). 
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interpreting the statute to prohibit dual awards.485  VA General Counsel 
precedential opinions are binding on the VA; hence, the VA denied the 
son’s request for benefits based on his mother’s disability because the son 
had already received benefits based on his father’s disability.486 
The Veterans Court reversed the VA’s denial.487  Applying Skidmore, the 
court noted that it would defer to the VA interpretation to the extent the 
interpretation was persuasive because “such opinions do constitute a body 
of experience and informed judgment.”488  After reviewing the statutory 
language and rejecting the VA’s interpretation, the court cited Gardner’s 
Presumption in noting that “[e]ven if the question . . .  were a close one, the 
Court is bound to find [for the veteran’s son].”489  After finding the VA 
interpretation unpersuasive and inconsistent with the statutory language, 
the court rejected the VA’s interpretation entirely.490   
Similarly, in Sharp v. Shinseki491 the Veterans Court turned to Gardner’s 
Presumption after first finding that Skidmore, rather than Chevron, 
applied.492  After exhaustively and unsuccessfully reviewing the text and 
legislative history of the statutes at issue,493 the court did not find the VA’s 
                                                          
 485. Id. at 256 (quoting Gen. Coun. Prec. 1-2002, at 1). 
 486. Id. at 256–57 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 7104(c) (2006)). 
 487. Id. at 261.   
 488. Id. at 256.   
 489. Id. at 259 (citations omitted). 
 490. Id. at 256–60; accord Hornick v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 50, 53 (2010) (applying 
Skidmore deference to review the VA’s interpretation contained in a general counsel 
precedent opinion).   
 491. 23 Vet. App. 267 (2009). 
 492. Id. at 275.  The facts of the case are complicated, but can be found in Jellum, 
Chevron’s Step Zero?, supra note 189.  Importantly, although the VA had promulgated two 
regulations that both related to the issue, Chevron did not apply because in Gonzales v. 
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006), the Supreme Court held that when regulations merely parrot 
statutory language, Chevron is inappropriate.  Sharp v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 267, 275 
(2009).  Here, the Veterans Court found that the implementing regulations parroted the 
underlying statutory language.  Id. at 274–75.  Thus, Skidmore rather than Chevron, applied.  
Id. at 275.  
 493. The court noted that the text of that section was silent regarding how the effective 
date for such additional compensation should be determined.  23 Vet. App. at 272.  In the 
face of this silence, the court turned to the legislative history of this statute.  According to 
the court, the legislative history suggested that the purpose of the statute was to “defray the 
costs of supporting the veteran’s . . . dependents when a service-connected disability is of a 
certain level hindering the veteran’s employment abilities.”  Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-
1054, at 19 (1978)).  While this purpose might favor a broad interpretation of § 1115 
generally, the legislative history did not specifically identify the effective date that should 
apply to additional compensation claims under § 1115:   
The limited legislative history enlightens the Court as to the purpose of providing 
additional compensation for dependents, but such history does not assist the Court 
in determining whether Congress intended additional compensation for dependents 
under section 1115 to be on (1) only the first rating decision meeting statutory 
criteria of section 1115 or (2) any rating decision meeting the statutory criteria. 
Id.   
Finding the legislative history unenlightening, the court returned to the text and concluded 
that entitlement to § 1115 benefits should accrue whenever the statutory factors were met.  
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interpretation persuasive because “the Secretary ha[d] offered no support 
for his position.”494  To resolve the ambiguity, the court turned to 
Gardner’s Presumption and stated that Gardner required an “expansive 
reading of the statute.”495  Finding the veteran’s interpretation to be more 
favorable to veterans, the court reversed the VA’s determination.496 
In the same way, the Federal Circuit has applied Gardner’s Presumption 
when Chevron did not apply.  In Sursely, the court reversed a Veterans 
Court’s opinion affirming the VA’s decision to refuse a veteran’s request 
for two separate clothing allowances.497  The facts of the case were stated 
earlier:498  the Veterans Court affirmed the VA’s denial of the second claim 
based on the fact that the relevant statute was clear because it used the 
singular, reading “shall pay a clothing allowance.”499  The Federal Circuit 
reversed.500  Because the Veteran Court’s contrary interpretation suggested 
ambiguity, the Federal Circuit reviewed the enactment history501 and 
mentioned Gardner’s Presumption.502  Specifically, the court noted that in 
the face of statutory ambiguity, it had to apply Gardner’s Presumption.503  
Importantly, the court noted in a footnote that because Chevron was 
inapplicable, the court could consider Gardner’s Presumption.504 
Thus, while Gardner’s Presumption should have limited or no 
application when the VA has interpreted a statute in a manner entitling that 
interpretation to Chevron deference, Gardner’s Presumption is appropriate 
when Chevron does not apply.  Even if courts apply Gardner’s 
Presumption to this narrow group of cases, however, courts should apply 
the Presumption to veterans’ benefits statutes only and not to generally 
applicable statutes.  Moreover, courts should return Gardner’s Presumption 
                                                          
Id.  In other words, although the statute did not explicitly so provide, the court concluded 
that whenever a veteran met § 1115’s criteria, the veteran’s dependents were impliedly 
entitled to additional compensation.  Id. 
 494. Id. at 275. 
 495. Id. at 275–76 (citing Sursely v. Peake, 551 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
 496. Id. at 277. 
 497. 551 F.3d at 1353.   
 498. See supra notes 274–286.  
 499. See Sursely v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 21, 22, 25–26 (2007) (referring to 38 U.S.C. 
§1162 (2003) (emphasis added)), rev’d, 551 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 500. Sursely, 551 F.3d at 1353. 
 501. As to the enactment history, originally, the statute had permitted clothing 
allowances for individuals using “a prosthetic or orthopedic appliance or appliances.”  Id. at 
1356 (quoting Veterans’ Compensation and Relief Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-328, § 103, 
86 Stat. 393, 394 (1972)).  In 1989, Congress amended the statute to delete the word 
“appliances” and to insert the singular:  “appliance.”  Id. at 1357.  According to the court, 
this extrinsic evidence—the amendment—showed that Congress intended “to provide 
additional benefits for those veterans . . . who use multiple orthopedic appliances.”  Id.  
 502. Id. at 1355. 
 503. Id. at 1357. 
 504. Id. at 1357 n.5 (“[W]e need not consider the applicability of Sears v. Principi, . . . 
which properly urges caution when considering the meaning of a statute in light of both 
Brown and Chevron.”). 
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to its childhood formulation:  it was only ever meant to encourage courts 
and the VA to interpret veterans’ benefits statutes liberally to thank 
veterans for their sacrifice and help them return to society smoothly.  
Gardner’s Presumption has since morphed well beyond its humble 
beginnings. 
E. Gardner’s Presumption Belongs to the VA, Not to the Court 
A final alternative, and perhaps the best way to resolve the tension 
between Gardner’s Presumption and Chevron would be to view the 
direction that “interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor”505 
as a duty belonging to the VA and not as an interpretive tool belonging to 
the courts.  Admittedly, this resolution is contrary to the Presumption as 
currently formulated.  Yet, this resolution would work.  The VA would 
have to provide adequate written reasons for its findings and conclusions of 
law and fact so that the veteran claimant can understand the basis for the 
VA’s decision and so that the Veterans Court can review that decision.506  
In these findings, the VA could be required to include information 
regarding whether it considered Gardner’s Presumption during its 
decision-making process.  The courts could then evaluate whether the VA 
met its duty when the courts apply either the second step of Chevron or 
Skidmore.  In other words, one test of the reasonableness or persuasiveness 
of the VA’s interpretation would be whether the VA took Gardner’s 
Presumption into account. 
This approach would place the duty of finding a reasonable 
interpretation that most favors veterans as a whole on the shoulders of the 
agency charged with helping veterans.  Given that the veteran-claimant will 
always be seeking benefits that the VA has denied, this duty would, at least 
where both the VA and veteran have proffered “reasonable” interpretations, 
require the VA to explain why its preferred interpretation better serves 
veterans as a group (for example, because of the number of individuals 
affected) as opposed to the veteran’s interpretation.  As such, the approach 
melds the best of the current approach—namely favoring veterans—with 
the best of the alternatives—including the VA’s expertise in the 
interpretation process. 
The Veterans Court actually suggested this approach in Cottle v. 
Principi.507  In that case, the VA General Counsel acknowledged that a 
statute could be read broadly to cover the veteran’s injury but admitted 
                                                          
 505. Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994). 
 506. See Allday v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 517, 527 (1995) (explaining the information that 
the Board of Veterans’ Appeals must provide to enable a claimant to understand its decision 
and for a court to review the decision). 
 507. 14 Vet. App. 329 (2001). 
JELLUM.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/2/2011  5:18 PM 
2011] RECONCILING BROWN V. GARDNER’S PRESUMPTION 121 
choosing to interpret the statute narrowly in her Precedent Opinion.508  The 
court rejected her interpretation and chastised her for “fail[ing] to discuss 
or consider Gardner at all.”509  The court stressed that Gardner’s 
Presumption required the VA to “resolv[e] any interpretative doubt in favor 
of the veteran.”510  While not exactly correct, the court’s suggestion 
supports the feasibility of this approach.   
The Veterans Court has toyed with this approach in other cases as well.  
For example, in Smith v. Nicholson,511 the court chided the VA for failing 
to consider Gardner’s Presumption.512  Similarly, Judge Kasold’s dissent in 
Ross v. Peake513 chastised the VA for failing to consider and discuss 
Gardner’s Presumption.514  Finally, in Jones v. Principi,515 the Veterans 
Court remanded the case, specifically directing the VA to evaluate the role 
that Gardner’s Presumption should play in the VA’s decision.516 
While placing the duty on the VA rather than leaving the Presumption to 
the courts to interpret statutes in favor of veterans might alleviate some of 
the conflict, it may not eliminate the conflict completely.  If courts at 
Chevron’s second step consider whether the VA considered Gardner’s 
Presumption when it interpreted a statute, then it is unclear whether an 
interpretation that does not favor a particular veteran-litigant would be 
veteran-friendly enough to be considered reasonable.  Thus, placing the 
burden on the VA may not completely eliminate the conflict between 
Gardner’s Presumption and Chevron, but it would be an improvement over 
the conflict in place today.   
CONCLUSION 
Gardner’s Presumption morphed from a simple directive to courts to 
construe veterans’ benefits statutes liberally into a veterans’ trump card in 
which the VA always loses the interpretive battle.  Today, Gardner’s 
Presumption is a canon of interpretation that directs courts to resolve 
interpretive doubt in a veteran’s favor.  Yet, Gardner’s Presumption 
directly conflicts with Chevron, which directs courts to adopt an agency’s 
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.  The Veterans Court and 
Federal Circuit have struggled unsuccessfully to resolve this conflict, while 
the Supreme Court has never directly addressed it.  Yet the two doctrines 
                                                          
 508. Id. at 336. 
 509. Id.  
 510. Id. 
 511. 19 Vet. App. 63 (2005), rev’d in part, 451 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 512. See id. at 73. 
 513. 21 Vet. App. 534, 536–37 (2008) (Kasold, J., dissenting) (denial of rehearing en 
banc). 
 514. See id. at 536. 
 515. 16 Vet. App. 219 (2002).   
 516. Id. at 226–27.   
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simply cannot coexist harmoniously as currently formulated.  Either the 
VA has the power to interpret ambiguous statutes pursuant to Chevron’s 
second step, or veterans have the power to interpret ambiguous statutes 
pursuant to Gardner’s Presumption.  If guidance from the Supreme Court 
is not forthcoming soon, the lower courts will have to resolve this issue 
themselves.517 
This article explores the conflict and offers three ways for the lower 
courts to resolve the tension.  First, regardless of which resolution is 
ultimately selected, Gardner’s Presumption should return to its humble 
beginnings.  Gardner’s Presumption began as a liberal construction canon, 
similar to the remedial statutes interpretive canon.  Rather than require 
courts to interpret all ambiguous statutes to favor veteran-litigants, the 
precursor to Gardner’s Presumption merely directed courts to construe 
ambiguous veterans’ statutes liberally.  Simply returning Gardner’s 
Presumption to its humble beginnings would eliminate most of the conflict 
between Gardner’s Presumption and Chevron. 
Second, the courts should apply Gardner’s Presumption in very limited 
situations.  Specifically, courts should apply Gardner’s Presumption only 
when the statute at issue addresses veterans’ benefits, or at least veterans, 
and only when the VA has not already interpreted the statute in a way that 
entitles the VA to Chevron deference.  Possibly, Gardner’s Presumption, as 
re-morphed, might play a role in Chevron’s first step; however, it should 
have absolutely no role in Chevron’s second step.   
Third, and alternatively, Gardner’s Presumption could be viewed as a 
duty belonging to the VA rather than as an interpretive canon to be applied 
by the courts.  With this approach, whether the VA considered Gardner’s 
Presumption, whatever its formulation, in interpreting a statute would be 
just one factor for a court to consider when applying either Chevron’s 
second step or Skidmore deference.  This resolution is appropriate because 
it returns interpretive power to the VA while constraining the VA’s 
interpretive choices.  If the VA were unable to explain why a particular 
interpretation would be most beneficial to veterans as a whole, then the 
VA’s interpretation would be neither reasonable under Chevron, nor 
persuasive under Skidmore.  While this resolution makes the most sense, it 
is admittedly not in concert with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this 
area.  Thus, the Veterans Court and Federal Circuit may feel compelled not 
to adopt this appealing approach.  
In sum, there is no perfect resolution to this conflict, but there are a few 
workable alternatives.  The time has come for the lower courts to resolve 
                                                          
 517. See DeBeaord v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 357, 368 (2004) (noting that guidance from 
the Supreme Court is necessary to resolve the issue). 
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this conflict by offering concrete and consistent direction for those 
litigating veterans’ cases, as the Supreme Court appears unlikely to offer 
guidance anytime soon.  
 
